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ABSTRACT  
The first chapter of this dissertation evaluates the impact of state-level Medicaid 
reimbursement rates for obstetric care on prenatal care utilization across demographic 
groups. It also uses these rates as an instrumental variable to assess the importance of 
prenatal care on birth weight. The analysis is conducted using a unique dataset of 
Medicaid reimbursement rates and 2001-2010 Vital Statistics Natality data. Conditional 
on county fixed effects, a doubling of reimbursement rates yields an additional prenatal 
visit for black disadvantaged mothers, an 11% increase. The magnitude of the effect is 
somewhat smaller for white disadvantaged mothers. However, the effect of an additional 
prenatal visit on birth weight is virtually zero for black disadvantaged mothers, while an 
additional visit yields a substantial increase in birth weight of over 20 grams for white 
disadvantaged mothers. 
In the second chapter, using data from PSID time diaries, I analyze the effect of 
maternal time involvement with a child on a set of the child’s cognitive and non-
cognitive outcomes. I construct a direct measure of maternal time with children, as well 
as differentiate the time by level of maternal involvement. This allows the analysis of a 
trade-off between maternal quality time and passive interaction with a child. I find that a 
child’s active engagement time with his or her mother has a greater effect on decreasing 
behavioral problems. I also find positive evidence of maternal time on the improvement 
of socio-emotional competence. In the case of cognitive skills, I find little support for the 
positive effects of maternal time on the development of these types of skills. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT, PRENATAL CARE  
AND INFANT HEALTH 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Poor health at birth is associated with significant medical costs, long-lasting 
health issues and decreased labor market prospects later in life. For instance, economic 
studies have found evidence that low birth weight children are more likely to have lower 
educational attainment, lower wages and worse employment prospects as compared to 
children with normal birth weights (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Currie and Hyson, 
1999; Black and Salvanes, 2007). Given the importance of early health on a child’s future 
well-being, public assistance programs like Medicaid have focused on policies aimed at 
improving infant health through prenatal care utilization. This chapter analyzes how 
changes to Medicaid reimbursements to physicians impact prenatal care utilization, and 
whether prenatal care leads to better health outcomes. 
Medicaid is a means-tested medical assistance program established in 1965 and 
funded by federal and state governments. Currently, the costs for more than 40% of all 
births are covered by Medicaid. In order to encourage prenatal care utilization, over the 
last two decades the Medicaid program has been expanding eligibility to pregnant women 
by increasing income cutoffs and simplifying application procedures. However, an 
increase in demand for medical services by Medicaid women does not insure that they 
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will be able to obtain necessary care. Traditionally, low Medicaid reimbursement rates 
have discouraged physicians to accept Medicaid recipients. According to a recent 
Medicaid Physician Fee survey, Medicaid physician payments have averaged 66% of 
Medicare payments (Zuckerman and Goin, 2012). Since Medicaid is administered on a 
state-by-state basis, federal agencies do not oversee Medicaid rate setting. States have 
considerable leeway when deciding how much to reimburse physicians for treating 
Medicaid patients. In an effort to increase physician participation in Medicaid, the federal 
government has agreed to fund an increase in Medicaid payments for 2013 and 2014. 
Given these most recent increases in Medicaid reimbursement generosity, it is important 
to understand how changes in reimbursement rates affect medical care utilization. 
Despite the fact that prenatal care has been commonly thought of as one of the 
major determinants of infant health, little is known about the causal effect of prenatal 
care. The difficulty associated with obtaining causal effect is due to the fact that 
unobservable maternal health endowments may have an effect on a child’s birth weight 
and also may determine whether or not pregnant women seek prenatal care. Numerous 
medical publications find a positive association between prenatal care and birth weight, 
for the most part ignoring the endogeneity of prenatal care. Economic research, on the 
other hand, finds less convincing results as to the positive effects of prenatal care. Studies 
can be classified by those that find positive effects (Rosenzweig and Shultz, 1982, 1983, 
1989; Liu, Mroz, Adair, 2009; Liu, 1993) and studies that find no, or weak, effects 
(Currie and Grogger, 2002; Evans and Lien, 2005; Warner, 1995).  
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 In this study, using restricted data from the 2001-2010 Vital Statistics Natality 
files and an assembled Medicaid reimbursement rates dataset, I examine the effect of 
Medicaid reimbursement for obstetric procedures on prenatal care utilization. 
Additionally, this study asks the question of what is the effect of prenatal care on birth 
weight. In order to identify the causal effect of prenatal care on birth weight, I employ an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. In particular, I use variation across states, and over 
time, in Medicaid reimbursement fees. I focus special attention on disadvantaged 
mothers, as they are primary targets of the Medicaid program. The results indicate that an 
increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates to a physician for obstetric care has a positive 
effect on the number of prenatal care visits that a woman receives. More specifically, a 
doubling of reimbursement rates is associated with an increase in prenatal care by 
approximately one visit for black disadvantaged mothers (e.g. high school dropouts and 
teens). This corresponds to an 11% increase in mean visits. The magnitude of the effect is 
slightly smaller for white disadvantaged mothers. Finally, the IV estimation of the effect 
of prenatal care on birth weight provides evidence of a positive effect of additional 
prenatal care visits on birth weight for white disadvantaged mothers. An additional 
prenatal visit yields an increase in birth weight of above 20 grams for these mothers. 
Interestingly, I do not find evidence of a positive effect of prenatal care in the subsample 
of black mothers. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes previous literature on 
the generosity of Medicaid reimbursement rates, child’s health and prenatal care 
utilization. It also provides a brief overview of the extant literature on the effect of 
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prenatal care on birth weight. Section 1.3 provides background on Medicaid 
reimbursement payments to physicians. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 present a theoretical 
framework and empirical approach. Section 1.6 describes data sources and data collection 
procedures for state-level Medicaid reimbursements. Section 1.7 presents the results, and 
section 1.8 concludes this chapter. 
1.2. Literature Review  
  This study relates to two strands of health economic literature: research that 
focuses on the effect of Medicaid reimbursement generosity on infant health and health 
care utilization; and the vast body of literature on the effect of prenatal care on infant 
health. 
To my knowledge, only Currie et al. (1995) and Grey (2001) have directly 
examined the effect of Medicaid reimbursement rates for obstetric care on infant health 
outcomes and prenatal care utilization. Currie et al. (1995) focus on the relationship 
between infant mortality and the ratio of Medicaid reimbursement to private fees for 
obstetric care. They use state-level Vital Statistics data and build a state and year specific 
fee ratio for 1979-1992, obtaining Medicaid reimbursement data from private and 
government sources. To identify the effect of Medicaid physician payments on infant 
mortality, they exploit a substantial variation in the fee ratio across states and over time. 
They find that an increase in fee ratio is associated with significant declines in infant 
mortality. More specifically, raising the fee ratio by 10 percentage points lowers infant 
mortality by 0.5-0.9%.  
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Grey (2001) studies the relationship between Medicaid reimbursement fees for 
obstetric care and first trimester prenatal care utilization among Medicaid insured 
women. He also investigates the effect of higher fees on birth weight. Using data from 
the 1988 National Maternal and Infant Health Survey, and applying a cohort difference-
in-difference model, he finds that a 10% increase in Medicaid fee results in more than a 
1% increase in the use of prenatal care during the first trimester. The results also suggest 
a significant negative association between Medicaid reimbursement fees and the risk of 
low birth weight.  
More recently, Buchmueller et al. (2013) examine the effect of changes in 
Medicaid reimbursement rates for dental procedures on access to dental care for publicly 
insured children. The study uses data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) over 2001-2010, along with data on Medicaid reimbursement fees 
for 15 common dental procedures. The study finds a positive relationship between 
Medicaid dental rates and the number of dental visits and the probability that a child 
received dental sealants. Estimates indicate that a 10 dollar increase in reimbursement fee 
increases the probability of an annual dental visit by 1.3 percentage points. The study also 
tests the hypothesis that an increase in dental care utilization results from dentists’ 
increased willingness to accept Medicaid patients. Results imply that higher Medicaid 
reimbursement fees increase the percentage of patients with public health insurance that 
are treated by a dentist.  
The literature on the effect of prenatal care and infant health is voluminous. 
Economists have been interested in estimating health production function for the last 40 
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years. Rosenzweig and Shultz (1982) were among the first to formulate and estimate 
infant health production function. In later years, Corman and Hope (1987), Grossman and 
Joyce (1990), and Warner (1995) build on Rosenzweig and Shultz. To identify the effect 
of prenatal care, these studies rely primarily on Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), using 
the availability of health care on a state level and local labor market conditions as the 
exclusion restriction.  
More recent literature has focused on Medicaid and welfare changes throughout 
the 1990s. For instance, Currie and Grogger (2002) evaluate the effect of changes to the 
Medicaid program on prenatal care utilization and infant health. The three types of 
policies under consideration are: changes in income eligibility, administrative reform, and 
changes in welfare caseloads. The researchers find that increases in income cutoffs 
increased prenatal care use, while decreases in welfare caseloads reduced the use of 
prenatal care. Using 2SLS, with policy variables as instruments, they find that an increase 
in prenatal care induced by policy changes resulted in a decrease in the incidence of very 
low birth weights for Whites, but by only 0.1% among the total population.  
Evans and Lien (2005) examine the impact of prenatal care on birth outcomes, 
using the 1992 Port Authority Transit strike in Allegheny County, PA as an exogenous 
source of variation in access to prenatal care. The first stage estimates show a decrease in 
prenatal care visits as a result of the strike for residents who rely the most on public 
transportation to get to prenatal care appointments. However, the second stage estimates 
show little effect of prenatal care on birth weight. To be more specific, one additional 
prenatal care visit results in a 2.36 gram increase in average birth weight, however, the 
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coefficient is imprecise due to a large standard error (se 24.09). Further, the authors find 
that prenatal care visits missed during the early stages of pregnancy reduced birth weight 
by 56.51 (se 37.32) grams. The authors conclude that results showing a positive effect of 
prenatal care are only suggestive due to the imprecision.  
Despite the resurgence of interest in the effect of Medicaid reimbursement rates 
increases, there is a paucity of evidence on how Medicaid reimbursement to physicians 
impacts prenatal care utilization among women. Given that Medicaid finances a very 
large percentage of births, it is crucial to understand how payment generosity impacts 
access to care. This study improves on previous literature by providing new results on the 
effect of Medicaid reimbursement rates for obstetric procedures on prenatal care use. To 
this end, I collect a unique dataset on state-level Medicaid reimbursement fees for 
obstetric care from 2001-2010 and merge it with individual level data on every birth in 
the U.S. A very large dataset allows me to obtain precise estimates as well as focus on 
narrowly defined demographic groups of women.  Additionally, the study provides new 
estimates of the effects of prenatal care on infant health by using a unique instrument and 
the most recent Vital Statistics data. 
1.3. Medicaid Reimbursement Rates Background 
Medicaid is funded by the federal and state governments, and is administered on a 
state-by-state basis. Each state establishes its own income eligibility threshold and 
determines the type, duration and scope of services, rate of payment for services, etc. To 
qualify for federal funding, however, states are required to cover all pregnant women 
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with incomes at or below 133% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). Most states, though, 
have expanded Medicaid coverage for pregnant women above the mandated cutoff. For 
instance, in Utah in 2010 the FPL income cutoff for Medicaid eligibility was 133%, while 
in Iowa the income cutoff was 300%. Appendix A Table 1.12 summarizes Federal 
Poverty Levels (FPL) eligibility thresholds for pregnant women across states for select 
years. 
States reimburse providers through fee-for-service or managed care arrangements. 
Under fee-for-service Medicaid, states pay physicians for each specific procedure 
performed. According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), states 
develop their payment rates based on the costs of providing the service, a review of what 
commercial payers pay in the private market, and Medicare payment for equivalent 
services. There is considerable variation across states in the generosity of Medicaid 
reimbursement. Medicaid fees, however, have been historically below Medicare and 
private fee payments. It has been commonly thought that low Medicaid reimbursement to 
doctors may be partly to blame for their unwillingness to accept Medicaid patients. 
Physicians’ surveys have shown that fewer physicians nationally accept Medicaid 
patients than accept other types of insured patients (Zuckerman et al., 2004). In 2011-
2012, approximately 33% of primary care physicians were not accepting new Medicaid 
beneficiaries (Decker, 2013). Since physicians are not required to participate in the 
Medicaid program, increasing reimbursement rates may increase the number of 
participating providers. 
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In this study, Medicaid reimbursements are based on fee-for-service Medicaid. 
However, over the last decade, states have been shifting toward a managed care Medicaid 
arrangement. In this setting, managed care organizations deliver medical care to patients 
under an agreement with state Medicaid agencies. States reimburse providers with a fixed 
monthly payment, called capitation. However, according to Zuckerman (2012), Medicaid 
fee-for-service reimbursements remain a good proxy for Medicaid reimbursement 
generosity, since “fee-for-service physician reimbursement rates can affect what 
Medicaid managed care plans pay physicians, because these plans often receive monthly 
capitation payments based on what states would have paid for care on a fee-for-service 
basis.”  
To encourage Medicaid participation among physicians under the provision of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), most states have increased reimbursements for primary care 
services, both for fee-for-service Medicaid and managed care arrangements, starting in 
January 2013. This federally funded increase brought Medicaid reimbursement rates for 
primary care up to the Medicare level. On average, the Medicaid rates have increased by 
73%, and more than doubled in some states. Therefore, understanding the effect of 
Medicaid reimbursement generosity on medical care utilization is an important question, 
especially in the face of upcoming health care reforms. 
1.4. Theoretical Framework 
Generosity of Medicaid payments to physicians is one of the policy instruments 
available to state officials to encourage physician participation in Medicaid. A higher 
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willingness to provide services to Medicaid insured pregnant women can have an impact 
on the utilization of prenatal care, including its timeliness and frequency of visits.  
The starting point for defining the relationship between physician participation in 
the program and Medicaid reimbursement is Sloan et al. (1978). For simplicity, let us 
assume that a physician is operating in two markets by serving Medicaid patients and 
privately insured patients. The market for privately insured patients is characterized by a 
downward sloping demand curve, since the physician has price setting power in this 
market. The market of Medicaid insured can be represented by a perfectly elastic demand 
curve at the level of Medicaid reimbursement fee. The physician faces the cost of 
providing services to both markets, which are assumed to be the same. In order to 
maximize profits, the physician is equating marginal revenue to marginal costs in each 
market. If on the margin Medicaid reimbursement rates are lower than marginal revenue 
in the private market, the physician will only accept privately insured patients. If the 
physician is serving both types of patients at the optimal allocation level, marginal 
revenue in the private market will be equal to marginal revenue in the Medicaid market. 
One of the predictions of this model is that an increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates 
will increase the number of doctors that will treat any Medicaid patients, as well as 
increase the amount of services provided to Medicaid patients among physicians who 
treat both types of patients. 
It is unlikely, however, that increases in Medicaid reimbursement rates will lead 
to a decrease in the number of prenatal visits for privately insured patients. For instance, 
Buchmueller et al. (2013), in reference to dental care, indicate that there are some 
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physicians who do not accept any Medicaid patients at all, hence they will not be 
impacted by higher Medicaid rates. Also, they note that among the doctors who see a mix 
of patients, higher rates for privately insured patients due to higher Medicaid rates, will 
be mitigated by private insurance companies bearing some of the increase in prices. An 
alternative scenario is that higher reimbursement rates may induce doctors to work longer 
hours, decrease down time or rely more on medical support staff. In fact, Buchmueller et 
al. (2014) find that higher reimbursement rates for dental services do not decrease the 
number of visits provided to privately insured patients. They find that, as a response to 
lager Medicaid rates, doctors increase the total amount of visits, which is achieved 
primarily through a greater utilization of dental hygienists. Finally, an increase in 
reimbursement rates may bring new physicians into the market, which will increase the 
number of visits for both Medicaid patients and privately insured patients. 
Previous literature has generally found that an increase in Medicaid 
reimbursement to physicians induces them to offer their services to Medicaid patients. 
For instance, Decker (2007) finds that higher fees increase the number of private 
physicians who accept Medicaid patients, and increase the length of an average visit with 
a physician. More recently, Hahn (2013) finds that increasing Medicaid reimbursement 
rates is associated with an increase in Medicaid take-up and reduction in uninsured rates 
among poor children. Evidence from earlier literature also suggests that higher Medicaid 
reimbursements tend to cause physicians to treat more Medicaid patients (Held and 
Holahan, 1985; Mitchell, 1991; Showalter, 1997; Shen and Zuckerman, 2005; 
Buchmueller et al., 2013).  
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Medicaid reimbursement rate increases, however, may not have a dramatic impact 
on medical care utilization, as low-income patients may already be receiving care at 
federally funded health clinics or hospitals instead of office-based physicians. According 
to Baker and Royalty (2000), early literature has likely overstated the beneficial effects of 
Medicaid rate increases by failing to account for the shift in the site of care. They find 
that an increase in Medicaid reimbursement for obstetric procedures increases the number 
of poor patients seen by private office-based physicians, but decreases the number of 
poor patients seen in public settings. Additionally, Fossett et al. (1992) point out that the 
poor tend to reside in depressed inner cities that are typically underserved by physicians. 
Fee increases are unlikely to improve access to medical care, unless Medicaid 
reimbursement rate increases are large enough to incentivize physicians to relocate to 
underserved markets. Physicians also are not willing to serve Medicaid patients due to 
significant administrative burdens associated with participating in Medicaid, long waiting 
times to obtain payments and the complexity of Medicaid patients’ conditions (Long, 
2013).  
As the above literature suggests, an increase in Medicaid reimbursements 
provides physicians with incentives to offer prenatal care services to pregnant women, at 
the same time increasing prenatal care utilization. These increases, however, may not be 
dramatic. It is reasonable to believe, though, that Medicaid fees would have a direct 
effect on prenatal care utilization and would impact a child’s health outcome by 
improving access to prenatal care.  
1.5. Empirical Approach 
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In order to examine the effect of Medicaid reimbursement generosity on prenatal 
care utilization, I estimate the following equation for a mother-child pair i, at time period 
t, residing in state s and county c: 
PCitcs = β0 + β1Ratesits + β2Xitcs + β3Ztcs + Countysc + Yeart + ɛitcs, 
where PC stands for a measure of prenatal care; Rates are the Medicaid reimbursement 
payments made to physicians for obstetric care; Vector X includes a mother’s observable 
characteristics such as: mother’s age dummies, race, marital status, dummies for 
education level, including mothers with less than a high school education, high school, 
some college and college, and the child’s gender. Vector Z includes county 
unemployment rate, income (in 2010 dollars) and population density. County is a vector 
of county fixed effects that control for any time invariant area characteristics that may be 
correlated with reimbursement fees and prenatal care. Year is a vector of year fixed 
effects and ɛ is a random error.  
To account for the endogeneity of prenatal care when estimating the effect of 
prenatal care on infant birth weight, this study uses an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. The ideal instrument will have an effect on prenatal care, however, it will not 
directly impact birth weight. I use Medicaid reimbursement to physicians for obstetric 
care as my instrument. There is considerable variation in Medicaid reimbursements 
across states and time, which provides the basis for identification. I estimate the 
following equation using the 2SLS/IV: 
Yitsc = θ0 + θ1PCitsc+ θ2Xitsc + θ3Zitsc + Countysc + Yeart + µitsc, 
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where Y is birth weight, PC is the measure of prenatal care instrumented with Medicaid 
reimbursement rates, and µ is a random error term. The consistency of the estimate of θ1 
depends on the assumption of validity of Medicaid reimbursement generosity as an 
instrument for prenatal care. First, Medicaid reimbursement rates will need to have 
sufficient predictive power in determining prenatal care utilization. Second, Medicaid 
rates can only affect a child’s birth weight via their impact on prenatal care use. 
1.6. Data 
1.6.1. Vital Statistics Natality Data  
In this study, I use two main data sources: Vital Statistics Natality data and the 
assembled data on Medicaid reimbursements. The 2001-2010 Vital Statistics Natality 
data are provided by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). These data 
are collected from birth certificates, and include nearly all births occurring in the United 
States during a given year. This number is around 4 million newborns annually. 
However, births to U.S. citizens outside of the country are not included. The data contain 
individual level records on each child, and provide information on basic demographic 
characteristics of a mother, her pregnancy history, health of a newborn, prenatal care, and 
the mother’s medical and health data, including method of delivery, obstetric procedures, 
health risks, labor complications, etc. Unfortunately, the data do not specify whether a 
mother was covered by Medicaid.  
For the purposes of this study, I use restricted access data that contain geographic 
identifiers of maternal state and county of residence. Data on county unemployment, 
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income and population density come from Area Resource File. I restrict the sample to 
children of white and black mothers who are at least 15 years old and no older than 45. 
Additionally, I focus only on singleton births, and exclude children born to non-U.S. 
residents. Vital Statistics Natality data yield a very large sample size of over 4 million 
observations for black mothers and 21 million for white mothers.   
The Vital Statistics Natality data provide information on the number of prenatal 
care visits, as well as the month of prenatal care initiation. Various medical and economic 
studies implement different measures of prenatal care. For instance, Evans and Lien 
(2005) use the number of prenatal care visits; Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) utilize the 
number of months elapsed during pregnancy until an expectant mother visits a doctor; 
Currie and Grogger (2002) focus on the adequacy of prenatal care, whether prenatal care 
was initiated at all, and late prenatal care. In my study, I focus on the frequency of 
prenatal care as measured by the number of prenatal visits, due to Medicaid 
reimbursement rates being a stronger instrument for prenatal care visits. Also, the effect 
of the number of prenatal care visits on birth weight is of special interest on its own, as 
medical organizations and doctors urge women to obtain regular and frequent prenatal 
visits, currently recommended at 14 visits for a low-risk pregnancy. Additionally, I use an 
indicator for the first trimester prenatal care utilization, whether a mother had any 
prenatal care and the adequacy of prenatal care as measured by the Kessner Index (equals 
to 1 if care is adequate), which takes into consideration the trimester of prenatal care 
initiation, the number of prenatal care visits and the length of gestation
1
.  
                                                          
1
 Appendix A provides more information on the Kessner Index measure of prenatal care. 
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Table 1.1A provides sample summary statistics by race of the mother, while Table 
1.1B provides summary statistics for county characteristics. The disparities between 
children of white and black mothers are already apparent at birth. The average birth 
weight of infants born to Whites is approximately 3,355 grams, as opposed to 3,125 
grams for Blacks. Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of birth weight by race. Black mothers 
are younger and have lower educational attainment and are much less likely to be married 
as compared to white mothers. When we consider measures of prenatal care, white 
mothers are more likely to initiate prenatal care earlier, have adequate care and have 
more prenatal visits as opposed to black mothers. Figure 1.2 plots the distribution of 
prenatal visits for Blacks and Whites. Since Vital Statistics data do not provide 
information on Medicaid coverage, I split my sample into various demographic groups of 
mothers to identify mothers who are most likely to be covered by Medicaid. I divide my 
sample by race and education groups: mothers who are high school dropouts, high school 
graduates, mothers with some college and college graduates. I also compare unmarried 
high school dropouts with unmarried mothers with at least a high school education, and 
perform my analysis for teens and mothers who are at least 20 years of age. Table 1.2 
provides summary statistics for the number of prenatal visits and birth weight for various 
demographic groups. As expected, the more disadvantaged mothers have a lower number 
of prenatal visits and lighter-weighing babies in comparison to their more advantaged 
counterparts.  
 To calculate the fraction of mothers on Medicaid in each demographic group, I 
use the 2001-2010 March Current Population Survey (CPS) and focus on mothers with 
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infants who reported Medicaid coverage in the previous calendar year. These mothers 
were most likely covered by Medicaid during pregnancy. Table 1.3 reports the percentage 
of mothers with infants on Medicaid for various demographic groups. It is important to 
note that CPS data are known to underestimate the actual Medicaid participation rate. 
Estimates of Medicaid undercount vary between 10-36% (Pascale et al. 2009). Table 1.3 
suggests that across women in the same demographic groups, black mothers are more 
likely to be Medicaid participants, as compared to white mothers. For instance, 64% of 
black high school dropouts have reported Medicaid coverage, as opposed to 37% of white 
mothers in the same demographic category. Similarly, the participation rate for black, 
college educated mothers is 12%, as opposed to 5% for white, college educated mothers. 
1.6.2. Medicaid Reimbursement Data 
Unfortunately, federal agencies do not collect Medicaid reimbursement schedules 
data for specific procedures. Starting with 1993, the Urban Institute, in conjunction with 
the Kaiser Family Foundation, has been conducting Medicaid physician fee surveys every 
4-5 years, collecting rates for 30 of the most common procedures. The individual states, 
however, change their reimbursement fee schedules on an annual basis. The annual data 
are better suited to capture the variability of Medicaid reimbursements across time and 
states.  
For this study, I assemble a state-level dataset of Medicaid reimbursement rates 
for obstetric care during the time period of 2001-2010 and merge it with Vital Statistics 
Natality data. I have collected part of the data by examining Medicaid fee schedules 
18 
posted on the states’ Department of Health websites. In instances where historical fee 
schedules were not available, I have contacted state health departments by email or by 
phone, or have made open records requests to state Medicaid offices. In the collected 
sample, 27 states have 100% data coverage, while 9 states have between 80-90% data 
coverage. In a number of states, the historical data are missing for some years. In 
instances where data were not available across all years, most states have complete data 
coverage after 2005. Appendix A Table 1.10 provides more details on data coverage 
across states and years, including the percentage of data availability for each state. I 
exclude from my analysis Tennessee, since it did not have a Medicaid fee-for-service 
component. I also exclude Indiana and New Jersey due to the inability of obtaining data 
for these states.  
The reimbursement rates have been deflated to 2010 dollars using the CPI for 
medical services. I use the reimbursement to physicians for CPT
2
 code 59400, which is 
the payment for total obstetric care including prenatal care, vaginal delivery and 
postpartum care. The advantage of this particular procedure is that it is more common 
and is available for more states and years. This particular procedure code has also been 
used by Currie et al. (1995) and Grey (2001). Not all states, however, reimburse this 
procedure code. For these states, I impute the reimbursement fee from the payment for 
delivery and the fee for basic doctors’ visits and the cost of postpartum care. Appendix A 
provides more information on data imputations. 
                                                          
2
 CPT, defined as Current Procedural Terminology, is a medical code set maintained by the American 
Medical Association. 
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The generosity of Medicaid payment to physicians varies significantly across 
states and time. For instance, the national average reimbursement for obstetric care in 
2010 was approximately 1,546 dollars, with a maximum of 2,984 dollars in Wyoming 
and a minimum of 815 dollars in Rhode Island. Appendix A Table 1.11 provides 
reimbursement fees for obstetric care for select years. Figure 1.3 shows a downward 
trend in average reimbursement rates across time in 2010 dollars deflated with CPI for 
medical services and overall CPI
3
. To obtain a more detailed picture of state 
reimbursement rates, Figure 1.4 plots the Medicaid reimbursement rates by state and over 
time. Despite the fact that most states have been increasing Medicaid reimbursements, 
these increases did not keep up with inflation, and payments were actually declining in 
real dollars.   
1.7. Results 
1.7.1. Effect of Medicaid Rates on Prenatal Care 
Table 1.4 summarizes the results of the effect of log Medicaid reimbursement 
rates on the number of prenatal care visits by race of the mother. All regressions include 
mother age dummies, county and year fixed effects, county unemployment, income and 
population density with standard errors clustered on the state level. The results suggest 
that doubling Medicaid reimbursement rates yields an increase in prenatal visits of 
approximately 0.9 visits for black mothers and 0.6 visits for white mothers. This is 
                                                          
3
 In my estimation I use Medicaid rates deflated with CPI for medical services but the results are robust to 
using overall CPI. 
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equivalent to an 8% increase in mean visits for Blacks and a 5% increase in mean visits 
for Whites. The effect of other control variables on the number of prenatal visits is in 
accordance with previous literature. More educated mothers and married mothers have 
more prenatal visits. Even after controlling for county fixed effects, county income is 
positively associated with the number of prenatal visits. On the other hand, county 
unemployment rates yield insignificant economic and statistical effects on prenatal care 
utilization. 
In order to identify the mothers most likely impacted by Medicaid, I stratify my 
sample by education level and race. The fraction of mothers on Medicaid is larger for the 
least educated group, hence one would predict the effect of changes in reimbursement 
rates to be more concentrated among those with the lowest levels of education. It is 
important to note that the estimated effect is the overall effect in population without 
restricting the sample to Medicaid participants. Table 1.5 contains estimates of the effect 
of Medicaid reimbursement on the number of prenatal visits by education and race of the 
mother. To conserve on space, I suppress the point estimates for the control variables, 
and report more detailed results in Appendix B Table 1.13. Focusing on black mothers 
first, the largest effect of Medicaid reimbursement on prenatal visits is present for more 
disadvantaged mothers: high school dropouts. For this group, doubling reimbursement 
rates increases the number of prenatal visits by 1.1 visits. This is equivalent to an 11% 
increase in mean visits. The effect of Medicaid reimbursement generosity declines if we 
move up across the education groups. For black college graduates, doubling Medicaid 
rates increases prenatal visits by only 0.6 visits. A similar pattern emerges for the 
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subsample of white mothers. For white high school dropouts, doubling reimbursement 
rates yields an increase in prenatal care utilization by 0.7 visits as opposed to only 0.4 
visits for college-educated mothers. 
Since the Vital Statistics data do not specify whether a mother was covered by 
Medicaid, I perform back-of-the-envelope calculations to approximate the effect of 
Medicaid reimbursement on actual Medicaid participants. In order to rescale my 
estimates, I use CPS data on the fraction of pregnant women who were covered by 
Medicaid. Using these Medicaid participation rates, we can approximate the treatment on 
the treated effect. For instance, if 64% of black high school dropouts are Medicaid 
participants, then doubling reimbursement rates for this group increases prenatal visits by 
1.7 visits. On the other hand, 37% of white high school dropouts participate in Medicaid, 
hence doubling reimbursement rates for this group increases prenatal visits by 
approximately 2 visits. The Medicaid participation rate among college educated black 
mothers is 12% and 5% for white college graduates. Hence, for college educated 
Medicaid mothers, doubling reimbursement rates yields almost 5 additional prenatal 
visits for Blacks and 9 visits for Whites. As mentioned earlier, the CPS data undercount 
the true number of Medicaid participants, which would overestimate the CPS adjusted 
estimates. 
Table 1.6 repeats point estimates from Table 1.5 and for each demographic group 
summarizes estimates adjusted for fractions of Medicaid participants. These estimates 
rely on the assumption that only Medicaid participants are affected by changes in 
Medicaid reimbursement rates. However, if doctors decrease the number of visits for 
22 
privately insured patients due to accepting more Medicaid mothers, then the adjusted 
estimates would represent an underestimate of the effect of Medicaid reimbursement 
rates on the number of prenatal care visits. A more likely scenario is that an increase in 
reimbursement rates could result in more physicians entering the market, which could 
also increase the number of visits for privately insured mothers. In this case, the treatment 
on the treated estimates would overstate the effect of reimbursement rates on prenatal 
visits among Medicaid participants, which could explain relatively large adjusted 
estimates of the effect of reimbursement rates on the number of visits among college 
educated mothers.  
1.7.2. Advantaged Versus Disadvantaged Mothers 
To further investigate the effect of Medicaid fees on prenatal care utilization, I 
separate the sample into unmarried high school dropouts and teenage mothers by race and 
compare them to their more advantaged counterparts. Education level and marriage status 
and being a teenage mother are good proxies for Medicaid participation. If the estimated 
effects are due to changes in Medicaid rates, one would anticipate the overall effects of 
Medicaid rates to be more pronounced for disadvantaged mothers, since this group would 
have a larger number of participants. Table 1.7 compares the results of Medicaid 
generosity on prenatal visits for more disadvantaged groups, as opposed to a more 
advantaged demographic category. For instance, in the subsample of black mothers, a 
doubling of reimbursement rates increases prenatal care utilization by approximately 1.1 
visits for unmarried high school dropouts, as opposed to an increase of 0.8 visits for 
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unmarried mothers with at least a high school education. For black teenage mothers, the 
effect is slightly smaller than the point estimate for older mothers: 0.7 visits versus 0.9 
visits. Moving to the subsample of white mothers, the effect of Medicaid reimbursement 
rates is larger for white high school dropouts, as opposed to white mothers with at least a 
high school education: 0.8 visits compared to 0.6 visits. Finally, in the subsample of 
teenage mothers, a doubling of Medicaid reimbursement rates increases prenatal care 
utilization by 0.8 for teenagers versus 0.6 visits for older mothers.  
1.7.3. Effect of Prenatal Care on Birth Weight  
The following results focus on the effect of prenatal care visits on the birth weight 
of infants by using Medicaid reimbursement rates as an instrument. It is important to note 
that the IV strategy in the case of a continuous instrument measures the weighted average 
of the causal effects of an endogeneous variable on the outcome of interest for those 
individuals who changed their behavior as a result of the instrument (Angrist and Imbens, 
1995). In this study, the IV estimate measures the weighted average causal effect of an 
additional prenatal visit on birth weight for those mothers who changed their prenatal 
care use due to changes in Medicaid reimbursement rates. Table 1.8 presents estimates of 
the effect of prenatal visits on a child’s birth weight by education and race of the mother. 
The table also contains a first stage F-statistic for the strength of the instrument and an 
underidentification test. 
Interestingly, for the subsample of black mothers, the results indicate both an 
economically small and statistically insignificant effect of prenatal visits on birth weight 
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across all education levels. In the subsample of white mothers, the effect of prenatal visits 
on birth weight is large and statistically significant for high school dropouts. More 
specifically, an additional prenatal visit yields a 24 gram increase in birth weight. For 
white mothers with some college education, this effect is estimated to be 16 grams per 
prenatal visit.  
Table 1.9 contains estimates of the effect of prenatal care on birth weight for 
unmarried high school dropouts and teenagers, and compares the results to estimates for 
the more advantaged mothers. The point estimates are small and statistically insignificant 
for the subsample of black mothers. On the other hand, for white unmarried high school 
dropouts, an additional visit is associated with a 23 gram increase in birth weight, and 21 
gram increase for white teenage mothers. These estimates are large in magnitude and 
statistically significant at conventional levels. As the F-statistics at the bottom of Table 
1.8 and Table 1.9 indicate, Medicaid reimbursement rates are a reasonably strong 
instrument for prenatal care among most disadvantaged mothers, exceeding the threshold 
of 10 as suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). 
1.7.4. Additional Regressions 
1.7.4a. Alternative Measures of Prenatal Care 
Appendix C Table 1.17 presents estimates of the effect of log Medicaid 
reimbursement rates on alternative measures of prenatal care: an indicator for the first 
trimester prenatal care, whether a mother had any prenatal care and adequacy of care as 
measured by the Kessner Index. For ease of interpretation, I use linear probability 
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models. As in previous discussions, point estimates are presented by mother’s race and 
education. For the Kessner Index, an increase in reimbursement rates increases the 
probability that care is adequate. For instance, doubling reimbursement rates would 
increase the probability that a mother obtains adequate care by 8 percentage points for 
black high school dropouts and 6 percentage points for white high school dropouts. 
However, the estimates are not statistically significant. For mothers with a high school 
education, the results are similar: doubling rates would increase adequate care by 9 
percentage points for Blacks and 6 percentage points for Whites.  
The results show a positive yet insignificant statistical and economic effect of 
reimbursement rates on the probability of receiving prenatal care in the first trimester for 
Whites and Blacks. On the other hand, increasing reimbursement rates decreases the 
probability that a mother will go without any prenatal care. For instance, in the case of 
white and black high school dropouts, doubling reimbursement rates decreases the 
probability of them obtaining no care by approximately 2 percentage points, but the point 
estimate is statistically significant only for white mothers. Not obtaining any prenatal 
care is very rare for pregnant women. For instance, among black high school dropouts, on 
average 4% of women do not receive any care (sd 0.19), while for white mothers in the 
same group this number is 3% (sd 0.16). Hence, the estimated effects of higher 
reimbursement rates on the probability of not getting any prenatal care are substantial. As 
in the case of prenatal visits, in most instances the estimated effects of changes in 
Medicaid rates on alternative measures of prenatal care are larger for Black mothers 
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(except for first trimester care) and decline in magnitude as we move up across levels of 
education.  
1.7.4b. Effect of Prenatal Care on Alternative Measures of Infant Health 
In addition to using a continuous measure of birth weight as an outcome of 
interest, I estimate the effect of prenatal care on the probability of being born with a low 
birth weight (<2500g), very low birth weight (<1500g), and the probability of being born 
premature (<37 weeks of gestation). Generally, low birth weight infants—and especially 
those born with a very low birth weight—face severe medical problems and 
developmental difficulties. Additionally, according to the CDC, health issues related to 
prematurity were responsible for 35% of all infant deaths in 2008. Preterm infants may 
suffer long-term neurological issues, developmental delays and physical disabilities 
leading to significant health care cost for families. Table 1.18 in Appendix C provides 
sample summary statistics for alternative measures of infant health across disadvantaged 
groups of mothers by race. 
Appendix C Table 1.19 summarizes the effect of prenatal visits, instrumented by 
Medicaid reimbursement rates, on these alternative measures of infant health. The results 
are reported by race for the most disadvantaged groups of mothers: high school dropouts, 
unmarried high school dropouts and teenage mothers. In most cases, Medicaid 
reimbursement rates serve as a relatively strong instrument, with the first-stage F-statistic 
around the threshold of 10 (except for the case of black teenage mothers).  
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I find that an additional prenatal visit decreases the probability of having a 
preterm baby, however, the estimated effects are economically small and not statistically 
significant. Also, an additional prenatal visit decreases the probability of being born with 
a low weight. Point estimates are statistically insignificant and small in magnitude for 
black mothers, but larger among white mothers. In the of case of very low birth weight, 
point estimates for black disadvantaged mothers are “wrong signed” and suggest that 
increases in prenatal visits can increase the probability of giving birth to a very low 
weight infant. One potential explanation for this result is that prenatal care could decrease 
the miscarriage rates of very sick babies (<1500g). The infants who would have been 
stillborn, but survived due to prenatal care, are nevertheless being born very unhealthy 
and light, so it may appear that prenatal care is associated with negative birth outcome. 
One of the ways to test this hypothesis would be to investigate the impact of prenatal care 
on fetal death, which is an objective of my future work. The Vital Statistics Natality data 
provide information on infants who are born alive. However, NCHS also collects data on 
fetal deaths, which could be merged with the natality files. Finally, for the subsample of 
white disadvantaged mothers, an additional prenatal visit decreases the probability of 
having a very low birth weight infant.  
1.8. Conclusions 
This chapter investigates whether an increase in Medicaid reimbursement to 
physicians for obstetric care impacts prenatal care utilization. Additionally, it evaluates 
how changes in prenatal care, induced by increases in Medicaid reimbursement rates, 
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impact birth weight. To address these questions, I collect a unique dataset on Medicaid 
reimbursement rates to physicians for obstetric care and merge it with 2001-2010 Vital 
Statistics Natality data. I find a positive effect of an increase in Medicaid reimbursement 
rates on the number of prenatal care visits that a mother makes. For instance, for black 
disadvantaged mothers (e.g. high school dropouts), doubling reimbursement rates 
increases the number of prenatal care visits by approximately one visit. For white 
mothers in the same demographic group, this effect is about 0.7 visits. Using estimates of 
Medicaid enrollment to adjust for Medicaid participation, and assuming that only 
Medicaid mothers are impacted by changes in Medicaid rates, these results suggest an 
increase in prenatal visits among Medicaid participants by 1.7 visits for Blacks and 2 
visits for Whites. On the other hand, only a very small fraction of most advantaged 
mothers (mothers with college education) are Medicaid participants, hence the implied 
effect of an increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates yields large increases in prenatal 
visits among these mothers. More advantaged mothers seem to be able to take better 
advantage of higher Medicaid reimbursement rates as opposed to least advantaged 
mothers. 
One way to put the results into perspective is to consider them in the context of 
recent Medicaid rate increases for primary care providers as a baseline. According to the 
most recent Medicaid Physician Fee Survey, on average, reimbursement rates for primary 
care were expected to increase by approximately 73% (Zuckerman and Goin, 2012). For 
instance, increasing Medicaid rates for obstetric care by the same amount would result in 
an increase in prenatal visits by approximately 0.8 visits (an 8% increase in mean) for 
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black high school dropouts, and by 0.5 visits (5% increase in mean) for white mothers 
who did not complete high school.  
To address the second question of this study and assess the impact of prenatal care 
on birth weight, I use an IV approach with Medicaid reimbursement rates as my 
instrument. I find that for white disadvantaged mothers, an additional prenatal visit yields 
an increase in birth weight of about 21-24 grams. This is a large effect, which is 
consistent with previous studies that used different identification strategies (Abrevaya, 
2006; Rous et al., 2004; Evans and Lien, 2005; Warner, 1998). Interestingly, in the case 
of black disadvantaged mothers, I find little evidence of a beneficial effect of prenatal 
visits on birth weight.  
In general, this study presents important findings, while simultaneously raising 
additional questions. The results indicate that an increase in Medicaid reimbursement to 
physicians would increase prenatal care utilization among pregnant women. However, 
despite statistical precision, the effect of reimbursement rates on prenatal visits is modest 
among disadvantaged mothers, the very mothers who are the major focus of the Medicaid 
program. Additionally, the paper points out meaningful differences that the effect of 
prenatal visits has on the birth weight of children born to white disadvantaged mothers, as 
opposed to that of black disadvantaged mothers. The finding of no positive effect of 
prenatal care on the birth weight of children of black disadvantaged mothers deserves 
further investigation. Ultimately, this study raises important policy questions of how 
changes to Medicaid can be targeted to benefit the most disadvantaged groups.  
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Figure 1.1 
Distribution of Birth Weight by Race 
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Figure 1.2  
Distribution of Prenatal Care Visits by Race 
Blacks 
 
 
Whites 
 
 
*Bin labelled “25” prepresents 25 visits or more.
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Figure 1.3 
Mean Medicaid Reimbursement Rates over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
Figure 1.4. Medicaid Reimbursement Rates by State and Year 
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Table 1.1A. Sample Summary Statistics 
Variables 
White 
(sd) 
Black 
(sd) 
Difference 
(se) 
Birth Weight (in grams) 3355.58 3125.59 229.986 
 
(544.04) (611.73) (0.289) 
Prenatal Visits 11.46 10.68 0.780 
 
(3.83) (4.35) (0.002) 
Kessner Index (1=adequate) 0.74 0.63 0.110 
 
(0.44) (0.48) (0.000) 
First Trimester Care 0.81  0.71  0.100  
 
(0.39) (0.45) (0.000) 
No Care 0.01  0.02  -0.010 
 
(0.11) (0.15) (0.000) 
Mother: Less than HS 0.22 0.23 -0.014 
 
(0.41) (0.42) (0.000) 
Mother: HS 0.28  0.37  -0.090 
 
0.45  0.48  0.000  
Mother: Some College 0.23 0.27 0.034 
 
(0.42) (0.44) (0.000) 
Mother: College 0.27 0.13 0.141 
 
(0.44) (0.33) (0.000) 
Mother Married 0.67 0.30 0.368 
 
(0.47) (0.46) (0.000) 
Age 27.53 25.62 1.905 
 
(6.04) (6.15) (0.003) 
Child Male 0.51 0.51 0.004 
 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.000) 
Observations 23,972,832 4,369,002 - 
 
 
Table 1.1B. Area Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Min  Max 
County Income (2010 dollars) 52745.50  18236.72 119075 
 
(13325.09) 
  County Unemployment  6.26  0.6 29.9 
 
(2.72) 
  County Population Density 2342.37  0.1 71201 
  (7313.12)     
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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Table 1.2 
Mean Birth Weight and Prenatal Visits 
Across Demographic Groups 
 
Variable Prenatal Visits   Birth Weight (in grams) 
  Black White 
 
Black  White 
Overall 10.68 11.46 
 
3125.59 3355.58 
 
(4.35) (3.83) 
 
(611.73) (544.04) 
HS Dropout 9.69  10.38  
 
3066.48  3283.76  
 
(4.52) (4.21) 
 
(597.00) (550.96) 
HS Graduate 10.54  11.33  
 
3111.69  3322.95  
 
(4.32) (3.84) 
 
(612.26) (552.67) 
Some College 11.18  11.78  
 
3152.81  3376.96  
 
(4.20) (3.68) 
 
(615.61) (543.27) 
College 11.79  12.17  
 
3215.46  3431.11  
 
(3.99) (3.40) 
 
(614.79) (519.23) 
Unmarried HS Dropout 9.62  10.26  
 
3050.10  3250.45  
 
(4.54) (4.26) 
 
(593.67) (550.70) 
Unmarried, at least HS 10.68  11.15  
 
3108.37  3294.44  
 
(4.32) (3.96) 
 
(612.77) (556.73) 
Teen 10.03  10.62  
 
3047.73  3229.33  
 
(4.28) (4.02) 
 
(577.47) (540.25) 
Age>19 10.80  11.54  
 
3141.20  3368.83  
  (4.35) (3.79)   (617.18) (542.73) 
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Table 1.3 
Medicaid Participation Rates in 2001-2010 CPS 
 
Mothers Black White 
Overall 0.38  0.18  
 
(0.49) (0.38) 
HS Dropout 0.64  0.37  
 
(0.48) (0.48) 
HS Graduate 0.44  0.28  
 
(0.50) (0.45) 
Some College  0.34  0.20  
 
(0.47) (0.40) 
College 0.12  0.05  
 
(0.33) (0.22) 
Unmarried HS Dropout 0.70  0.56  
 
(0.46) (0.50) 
Unmarried, at Least HS 0.47  0.44  
 
(0.50) (0.50) 
Teenager 0.57  0.44  
 
(0.50) (0.50) 
Age>19 0.36  0.17  
  (0.48) (0.37) 
Note: Calculations are based on 2001-2010 March CPS, and 
include all mothers with infants who reported being on Medicaid. 
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Table 1.4 
Effect of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates 
on Prenatal Visits by Race 
 
Variables Black White 
   Log Reimbursement Rates 0.854*** 0.606** 
 
(0.293) (0.238) 
   Mother: HS Dropout -0.762*** -0.857*** 
 
(0.0637) (0.124) 
   Mother: Some College 0.545*** 0.385*** 
 
(0.0345) (0.0234) 
   Mother: College 0.906*** 0.582*** 
 
(0.0717) (0.0432) 
   Mother Married 0.575*** 0.499*** 
 
(0.0335) (0.0394) 
   County Income 0.0360* 0.0264* 
 
(0.0204) (0.0150) 
   County Unemployment rate 0.0221 0.0306 
 
(0.0489) (0.0313) 
   R
2
 0.031 0.034 
Observations 4,369,002 23,972,832 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis are 
clustered on state level. All regressions include county and year fixed 
effects, mother age dummies. Mother with high school diploma is an 
omitted category. County income is in 2010 dollars (in thousands). 
Additionally, all regressions control for county population density.  
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Table 1.5 
Effect of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates on Prenatal Visits 
by Education and Race 
 
Variables 
HS  
Dropout 
HS 
Some 
College 
College 
     
 
Black Mothers 
     
Log Reimbursement Rates 1.072*** 0.887** 0.800*** 0.598** 
 
(0.328) (0.335) (0.286) (0.238) 
     Observations 1,013,813 1,620,081 1,171,717 562,375 
     
 
White Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates 0.734*** 0.668** 0.636*** 0.448** 
 
(0.241) (0.274) (0.236) (0.209) 
     Observations 5,235,907 6,635,060 5,625,859 6,475,996 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state level. All 
regressions include county and year fixed effects, mother age dummies, education, 
marriage status, county income, unemployment rate and population density. See Appendix 
Table B 1.13 for more details.  
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Table 1.6 
Effect of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates on Prenatal Visits 
by Education and Race (Adjusted) 
 
Variables 
HS  
Dropout 
HS 
Some 
College 
College 
     
 
Black Mothers 
     
Log Reimbursement Rates 1.072*** 0.887** 0.800*** 0.598** 
 
(0.328) (0.335) (0.286) (0.238) 
     Mothers on Medicaid 0.64 0.44 0.34 0.12 
     Adjusted Estimates 1.68 2.02 2.35 4.98 
     Observations 1,013,813 1,620,081 1,171,717 562,375 
     
 
White Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates 0.734*** 0.668** 0.636*** 0.448** 
 
(0.241) (0.274) (0.236) (0.209) 
     Mothers on Medicaid 0.37 0.28 0.20 0.05 
     Adjusted Estimates 1.98 2.39 3.18 8.96 
     Observations 5,235,907 6,635,060 5,625,859 6,475,996 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state level. All 
regressions include county and year fixed effects, mother age dummies, education, 
marriage status, county income, unemployment rate and population density.  
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Table 1.7 
Effect of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates  
on Prenatal Visits by Status 
 
Variables  
HS Dropout 
Unmarried 
HS & Above 
Unmarried 
Teen Age>19 
     
 
Black Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates 1.079*** 0.795** 0.741** 0.874*** 
 
(0.331) (0.306) (0.364) (0.286) 
     Observations 885,623 2,161,777 729,411 3,639,139 
     
 
White Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates 0.782*** 0.556*** 0.757*** 0.595** 
 
(0.226) (0.204) (0.226) (0.241) 
     Observations 3,046,620 4,848,245 2,276,103 21,696,723 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state level. All 
regressions include county and year fixed effects, mother age dummies, education, 
marriage status, county income, unemployment rate and population density. See Appendix 
B Table 1.14 for more details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
Table 1.8 
Effect of Prenatal Visits on Birth Weight 
by Education and Race 
 
Variables 
HS  
Dropout 
HS 
Some 
College 
College 
     
 
Black Mothers 
     Prenatal Visits -4.119 2.257 -3.274 4.363 
 
(6.820) (10.06) (9.943) (22.90) 
     First Stage F-statistic 10.700 7.000 7.810 6.290 
p-value [0.0020] [0.0111] [0.0075] [0.0157] 
     Underidentification test 3.353 3.26 2.842 2.577 
p-value [0.0613] [0.0710] [0.0918] [0.1085] 
Observations 1,013,813 1,620,081 1,171,717 562,375 
     
 
White Mothers 
     Prenatal Visits 24.37** 4.392 16.04* -9.919 
 
(12.36) (7.562) (9.712) (9.059) 
     First Stage F-statistic 9.230 5.960 7.260 4.580 
p-value [0.0039] [0.0185] [0.0097] [0.0376] 
     Underidentification test 3.909 3.482 3.723 2.985 
p-value [0.0480] [0.0620] [0.0537] [0.0840] 
Observations 5,235,907 6,635,060 5,625,859 6,475,996 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state level. All 
regressions include county and year fixed effects, mother age dummies, education, 
marriage status, county income, unemployment rate and population density. See 
Appendix B Table 1.15 for more details. 
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Table 1.9 
Effect of Prenatal Care on Birth Weight by Status 
 
Variables 
HS Dropout 
Unmarried 
HS & above 
Unmarried 
Teen Age>19 
     
 
Black Mothers 
     Prenatal Visits -0.473 4.102 -1.512 -0.140 
 
(6.758) (10.46) (10.82) (10.83) 
     First Stage F-statistic 10.64 6.77 4.13 9.36 
p-value [0.0021] [0.0124] [0.0477] [0.0037] 
     Underidentification test 3.822 3.096 3.016 3.226 
p-value [0.0506] [0.0785] [0.0824] [0.0725] 
Observations 885,623 2,161,777 729,411 3,639,139 
     
 
White Mothers 
     Prenatal Visits 22.98** 14.86 21.11* 7.671 
 
(11.49) (12.10) (12.61) (7.997) 
     First Stage F-statistic 11.96 7.42 11.16 6.11 
p-value [0.0012] [0.0090] [0.0016] [0.0171] 
     Underidentification test 4.082 3.229 5.710 3.386 
p-value [0.0433] [0.0723] [0.0169] [0.0658] 
Observations 3,046,620 4,848,245 2,276,103 21,696,723 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state level. All 
regressions include county and year fixed effects, mother age dummies, education, 
marriage status, county income, unemployment rate and population density. See Appendix 
Table B 1.16 for more details. 
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APPENDIX A 
States with Imputed Reimbursement Rates:  
Delaware  
Florida 
Illinois  
Kentucky 
Mississippi 
North Dakota 
Ohio  
South Carolina  
Texas  
West Virginia 
 
Codes used to impute “global obstetric care fee” are 99203 (doctor’s visit for a new 
patient), 99213 (doctor’s visit of an established patient), 59409 (vaginal delivery), 59430 
postpartum care).  
 
In my sample, the average number of prenatal visits is 11.3. Hence, I use the following 
formula to obtain the “global” obstetric fee:  
 
Total Fee = Cost of a visit for a new patient + 10.3* Cost of a visit for established patient 
+ Cost of delivery + Cost of postpartum care. 
 
 
 
Kessner Index 
 
Gestation  
(in weeks)  
Number of Prenatal 
Visits 
13 or less and 1 or more or not stated 
14-17 and  2 or more  
18-21 and  3 or more 
22-25 and  4 or more 
26-29 and  5 or more 
30-31 and  6 or more 
32-33 and 7 or more 
34-35 and 8 or more 
36 or more and 9 or more 
  * First prenatal visit initiated in the first 
trimester. 
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Table 1.10. Medicaid Reimbursement Rates Data Availability  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Alabama                   100% 
Alaska                   100% 
Arizona                   100% 
Arkansas                   100% 
California                   100% 
Connecticut                   100% 
DC                   100% 
Florida                   100% 
Georgia                   100% 
Hawaii                   100% 
Iowa                   100% 
Kansas                   100% 
Maine                   100% 
Minnesota                   100% 
Mississippi                   100% 
Missouri                   100% 
Montana                   100% 
Nevada                   100% 
New Hampshire                   100% 
New York                   100% 
Ohio                   100% 
Oregon                   100% 
Rhode Island                   100% 
Utah                   100% 
Vermont                   100% 
Virginia                   100% 
Wyoming                   100% 
Idaho   
 
              90% 
Massachusetts   
 
              90% 
South Dakota   
 
              90% 
Texas 
 
               90% 
Wisconsin                  90% 
Colorado             
  
  80% 
Michigan 
  
            80% 
Nebraska                 80% 
North Carolina   
   
          70% 
Oklahoma   
   
          70% 
South Carolina 
  
  
 
        70% 
West Virginia                70% 
Illinois   
    
        60% 
Kentucky 
    
         60% 
Louisiana 
    
          60% 
North Dakota               60% 
Pennsylvania                   50% 
Washington                   50% 
Delaware                   40% 
New Mexico                   40% 
Maryland 
    
  
   
  30% 
New Jersey            10% 
Indiana                   0% 
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Table 1.11. Medicaid Reimbursement Rates by State (2010 Dollars) 
 
State 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Alabama 1917 1664 1448 1300 
Alaska 3465 3092 2749 2822 
Arizona 2414 2095 2048 1869 
Arkansas 1622 1549 1347 1210 
California 1606 1393 1212 1089 
Colorado 1723 1495 
 
1155 
Connecticut 4127 3658 3310 2973 
DC 2212 1920 1670 1863 
Delaware 1228 
  
1615 
Florida 1697 1537 1286 1155 
Georgia 1925 1671 1454 1305 
Hawaii 1643 1426 1240 1114 
Idaho 1924 1750 1614 1539 
Illinois 
  
1023 1308 
Kansas 1957 1698 1477 1327 
Kentucky 1626 
 
1407 1454 
Louisiana 
  
1237 1230 
Maine 1814 1574 1370 1230 
Maryland 
   
1482 
Massachusetts 2060 2279 2173 2045 
Michigan 
 
1287 
 
1181 
Minnesota 1145 994 865 867 
Mississippi 1805 1592 1490 1362 
Missouri 1586 1376 1197 1183 
Montana 2073 1712 1870 1929 
Nebraska 1612 1539 1652 1543 
Nevada 3020 2620 2280 1599 
New Hampshire 1770 1536 1336 1200 
New Mexico 1909 
 
1754 1910 
New York 1529 1327 1155 1721 
North Carolina 2039 
 
1662 1370 
North Dakota 
  
1521 2204 
Ohio 1598 1387 1207 1187 
Oklahoma 1577 
 
1614 1542 
Oregon 1663 1578 1895 1956 
Pennsylvania 
 
2286 1989 1786 
Rhode Island 1202 1043 907 815 
South Carolina 
  
2024 1899 
South Dakota 1475 1536 1421 1367 
Texas 
 
1360 1126 1179 
Utah 1404 1346 1265 1276 
Vermont 2040 1836 1478 1327 
Virginia 1637 1434 1706 1643 
Washington 2694 
  
1983 
West Virginia 1630 
 
1824 1586 
Wisconsin 1449 1456 1267 1149 
Wyoming 1858 1794 2686 2985 
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Table 1.12. Medicaid Federal Poverty Levels for Pregnant Women 
 
States 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Alabama  133 133 133 133 
Alaska  200 175 154 175 
Arizona  140 133 133 150 
Arkansas  133 200 200 200 
California 300 300 300 200 
Colorado  133 133 133 200 
Connecticut  185 185 185 250 
Delaware  200 200 200 200 
D.C.  185 185 185 300 
Florida  185 185 185 185 
Georgia 235 235 235 200 
Hawaii  185 185 185 185 
Idaho  133 133 133 133 
Illinois  200 200 200 200 
Indiana  150 150 150 200 
Iowa  200 200 200 300 
Kansas  150 150 150 150 
Kentucky  185 185 185 185 
Louisiana  133 200 200 200 
Maine  200 200 200 200 
Maryland  250 250 250 250 
Massachusetts  200 200 200 200 
Michigan  185 185 185 185 
Minnesota  275 275 275 275 
Mississippi  185 185 185 185 
Missouri  185 185 185 185 
Montana  133 133 150 150 
Nebraska  185 185 185 185 
Nevada  133 133 133 185 
New Hampshire  185 185 185 185 
New Jersey  185 185 185 200 
New Mexico  185 185 185 235 
New York  200 200 200 200 
North Carolina  185 185 185 185 
North Dakota  133 133 133 133 
Ohio  150 150 150 200 
Oklahoma  185 185 185 185 
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Oregon  170 185 185 185 
Pennsylvania  185 185 185 185 
Rhode Island  250 185 185 250 
South Carolina  185 185 185 185 
South Dakota  133 133 133 133 
Tennessee  185 185 185 250 
Texas  185 185 185 185 
Utah  133 133 133 133 
Vermont  200 200 200 200 
Virginia  133 133 133 200 
Washington  185 185 185 185 
West Virginia  150 150 150 150 
Wisconsin  185 185 185 300 
Wyoming  133 133 133 100 
 Data Source: The National Governor’s Association’s (NGA) newsletters. 
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APPENDIX B 
Regressions Results Details 
 
Table 1.13 
Effect of Reimbursement Rates on Prenatal Visits by Education and Race 
 
 
Black White 
Variable 
HS  
Dropout 
HS 
Some 
College 
College 
HS 
 Dropout 
HS 
Some 
College 
College 
     
    Log Reimbursement Rates 1.072*** 0.887** 0.800*** 0.598** 0.734*** 0.668** 0.636*** 0.448** 
 
(0.328) (0.335) (0.286) (0.238) (0.241) (0.274) (0.236) (0.209) 
         Mother Married 0.762*** 0.659*** 0.496*** 0.297*** 0.435*** 0.575*** 0.518*** 0.433*** 
 
(0.0403) (0.0406) (0.0360) (0.0280) (0.0501) (0.0380) (0.0342) (0.0334) 
         County Income  0.0403* 0.0353* 0.0361 0.0340* 0.0455*** 0.0262* 0.0211 0.0176 
 
(0.0222) (0.0207) (0.0219) (0.0191) (0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0154) 
         County Unemployment  0.00129 0.0258 0.0287 0.0499 0.0402 0.0375 0.0217 0.0163 
 
(0.0505) (0.0514) (0.0449) (0.0527) (0.0258) (0.0365) (0.0324) (0.0275) 
         R
2
 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.003 
Observations 1,013,813 1,620,081 1,171,717 562,375 5,235,907 6,635,060 5,625,859 6,475,996 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered on state level. All regressions include county and year fixed effects, mother 
age dummies and county population density. County income is in 2010 dollars (in thousands). 
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Table 1.14 
Effect of Reimbursement Rates on Prenatal Visits by Status 
 
  Black White 
Variable 
HS Dropout 
Unmarried 
HS & above 
Unmarried 
Teen Age>19 
HS Dropout 
Unmarried 
HS & above 
Unmarried 
Teen Age>19 
         Log Reimbursement Rates 1.079*** 0.795** 0.741** 0.874*** 0.782*** 0.556*** 0.757*** 0.595** 
 
(0.331) (0.306) (0.364) (0.286) (0.226) (0.204) (0.226) (0.241) 
         Mother Married 
  
0.395*** 0.576*** 
  
0.254*** 0.523*** 
   
(0.0414) (0.0332) 
  
(0.0181) (0.0433) 
Mother: HS Dropout 
  
-0.584*** -0.818*** 
  
-0.583*** -0.910*** 
   
(0.0343) (0.0766) 
  
(0.0613) (0.142) 
Mother: Some College 
 
0.556*** 0.296*** 0.550*** 
 
0.383*** 0.182*** 0.380*** 
  
(0.0308) (0.0298) (0.0344) 
 
(0.0284) (0.0279) (0.0228) 
Mother: College 
 
1.073*** 
 
0.897*** 
 
0.720*** 
 
0.564*** 
  
(0.0782) 
 
(0.0701) 
 
(0.0490) 
 
(0.0441) 
County Income 0.0374 0.0357* 0.0256 0.0377* 0.0438*** 0.0240 0.0210 0.0268* 
 
(0.0223) (0.0205) (0.0197) (0.0206) (0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0152) 
County Unemployment  -0.00371 0.0214 0.00931 0.0250 0.0289 0.0306 0.0285 0.0303 
 
(0.0481) (0.0472) (0.0445) (0.0501) (0.0288) (0.0322) (0.0282) (0.0318) 
R
2
 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.030 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.032 
Observations 885,623 2,161,777 729,411 3,639,139 3,046,620 4,848,245 2,276,103 21,696,723 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state level. All regressions include county and year fixed effects, mother 
age dummies and county population density. Mother with high school is an omitted category. County income is in 2010 dollars (in thousands). 
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Table 1.15 
Effect of Prenatal Care on Birth Weight by Education and Race 
 
  Black White 
Variables 
HS  
Dropout 
HS 
Some 
College 
College 
HS 
 Dropout 
HS 
Some 
College 
College 
                  
Prenatal Visits -4.119 2.257 -3.274 4.363 24.37** 4.392 16.04* -9.919 
 
(6.820) (10.06) (9.943) (22.90) (12.36) (7.562) (9.712) (9.059) 
         Mother Married 96.93*** 70.17*** 60.17*** 65.75*** 33.27*** 62.75*** 61.20*** 71.74*** 
 
(7.437) (7.342) (4.889) (5.625) (9.208) (8.384) (7.659) (4.735) 
         County Income 0.853 0.864 1.112* -0.287 -1.569 -0.0345 -0.422 0.0476 
 
(0.661) (0.579) (0.619) (0.579) (0.987) (0.338) (0.453) (0.185) 
         County Unemployment -1.236* 0.876 1.075 0.469 0.449 0.0290 0.243 0.211 
 
(0.654) (0.815) (1.188) (1.325) (1.029) (0.649) (0.412) (0.744) 
         First Stage F-statistic 10.700 7.000 7.810 6.290 9.230 5.960 7.260 4.580 
p-value [0.0020] [0.0111] [0.0075] [0.0157] [0.0039] [0.0185] [0.0097] [0.0376] 
         Underidentification test 3.353 3.26 2.842 2.577 3.909 3.482 3.723 2.985 
p-value [0.0613] [0.0710] [0.0918] [0.1085] [0.0480] [0.0620] [0.0537] [0.0840] 
         R
2
 0.001 0.018 0.006 0.019 0.030 0.025 0.030 0.002 
Observations 1,013,813 1,620,081 1,171,717 562,375 5,235,907 6,635,060 5,625,859 6,475,996 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state level. All regressions include county and year fixed effects, 
mother age dummies and population density. County income is in 2010 dollars (in thousands). 
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Table 1.16. Effect of Prenatal Care on Birth Weight by Status 
  Black    White 
Variable 
HS 
Dropout 
Unmarried 
HS & 
above 
Unmarried 
Teen Age>19 
HS 
Dropout 
Unmarried 
HS & above 
Unmarried 
Teen Age>19 
         Prenatal Visits -0.473 4.102 -1.512 -0.140 22.98** 14.86 21.11* 7.671 
 
(6.758) (10.46) (10.82) (10.83) (11.49) (12.10) (12.61) (7.997) 
Mother Married 
  
50.08*** 71.21*** 
  
23.76*** 60.25*** 
   
(7.906) (6.251) 
  
(4.891) (8.655) 
Mother: HS Dropout 
  
-21.93*** -28.24*** 
  
-23.44*** -7.665 
   
(6.674) (8.750) 
  
(8.875) (10.38) 
Mother: Some College 
 
25.21*** 16.11*** 22.62*** 
 
23.76*** 20.80*** 25.63*** 
  
(5.288) (4.270) (5.594) 
 
(7.711) (5.098) (5.726) 
Mother: College 
 
50.42*** 
 
50.57*** 
 
52.73*** 
 
48.40*** 
  
(10.26) 
 
(8.895) 
 
(14.47) 
 
(8.250) 
County Income 0.616 0.624 0.349 0.760 -1.285 -0.472 -0.597 -0.331 
 
(0.651) (0.542) (0.572) (0.556) (0.861) (0.473) (0.684) (0.362) 
County Unemployment -1.869*** 0.992 -0.722 0.597 0.320 -0.690 -0.399 0.361 
 
(0.707) (0.651) (0.922) (0.694) (0.724) (0.504) (0.894) (0.693) 
First Stage F-statistic 10.64 6.77 4.13 9.36 11.96 7.42 11.16 6.11 
p-value [0.0021] [0.0124] [0.0477] [0.0037] [0.0012] [0.0090] [0.0016] [0.0171] 
Underidentification test 3.822 3.096 3.016 3.226 4.082 3.229 5.710 3.386 
p-value [0.0506] [0.0785] [0.0824] [0.0725] [0.0433] [0.0723] [0.0169] [0.0658] 
R
2
 0.008 0.020 0.005 0.015 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.031 
Observations 885,623 2,161,777 729,411 3,639,139 3,046,620 4,848,245 2,276,103 21,696,723 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state level. All regressions include county and year fixed effects, 
mother age dummies and county population density. Mother with high school is an omitted category. County income is in 2010 dollars (in 
thousands). 
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APPENDIX C  
Additional Regression 
 
Table 1.17. Effect of Medicaid Rates on 
Various Measures of Prenatal Care 
 
Variables 
HS  
Dropout 
HS 
Some 
College 
College 
     
 
Kessner Index 
    
 
Black Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates 0.0774 0.0868* 0.0558 0.0400** 
 
(0.0538) (0.0493) (0.0371) (0.0192) 
     
 
White Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates 0.0584 0.0616* 0.0417 0.0200 
 
(0.0355) (0.0356) (0.0281) (0.0199) 
     
 
First Trimester Care 
   
 
Black Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates 0.0456 0.0423 0.0106 0.0005 
 
(0.0682) (0.0627) (0.0527) (0.0345) 
     
 
White Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates 0.0478 0.0453 0.0184 0.0016 
 
(0.0426) (0.0381) (0.0258) (0.0150) 
     
 
No Care 
   
 
Black Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates -0.0192 -0.0105 -0.00897** -0.0039 
 
(0.0121) (0.00793) (0.00438) (0.00403) 
     
 
White Mothers 
     Log Reimbursement Rates -0.0190* -0.0066 -0.0030 -0.0015 
 
(0.0112) (0.00516) (0.00256) (0.00127) 
          
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state level. All 
regressions include county and year fixed effects, mother age dummies, education, marriage 
status, county income, unemployment rate and population density.  
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Table 1.18 
Sample Means of Various Measures  
of Infant Health 
 
Variables 
HS  
Dropout 
HS Dropout 
Unmarried 
Teen 
 
Black Mothers 
Preterm Delivery 0.174  0.177  0.166  
 
(0.379) (0.382) (0.372) 
    Low Weight 0.126  0.130  0.123  
 
(0.331) (0.336) (0.329) 
    Very Low Weight 0.023  0.024  0.023  
 
(0.150) (0.152) (0.150) 
    
 
White Mothers 
Preterm Delivery 0.114  0.122  0.117  
 
(0.318) (0.327) (0.321) 
    Low Weight 0.064  0.070  0.072  
 
(0.245) (0.256) (0.258) 
    Very Low Weight 0.010  0.011  0.011  
  (0.099) (0.104) (0.106) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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Table 1.19. Effect of Prenatal Care 
on Alternative Measures of Birth Weight 
 
Variables HS Dropout 
HS Dropout  
Unmarried 
Teen  
    
 
Preterm Infant 
  
Black Mothers 
 
    Prenatal Visits -0.0042 -0.0051 -0.0052 
 
(0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0110) 
    First Stage F-statistic 10.700 10.64 4.13 
p-value [0.0020] [0.0021] [0.0477] 
    
  
White Mothers 
 
    Prenatal Visits -0.0051 -0.0065 -0.0034 
 
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0055) 
    First Stage F-statistic 9.230 11.96 11.16 
p-value [0.0039] [0.0012] [0.0016] 
    
 
Low Birth Weight Infant (<2500g) 
  
Black Mothers 
 
    Prenatal Visits -0.0012 -0.0038 -0.0012 
 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0067) 
    
  
White Mothers 
 
    Prenatal Visits -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0039 
 
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0039) 
    
 
Very Low Birth Weight (<1500g) 
  
Black Mothers 
 
    Prenatal Visits 0.00309** 0.00309** 0.0034 
 
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0027) 
    
  
White Mothers 
 
    Prenatal Visits -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.00247* 
 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
        
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered on state 
level. All regressions include county and year fixed effects, mother age 
dummies, education, marriage status, county income, unemployment rate 
and population density.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EFFECT OF MATERNAL TIME ON A CHILD’S DEVELOPMENT: 
EVIDENCE FROM PSID TIME DIARIES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The importance of parental time investment on the development of cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills has been widely acknowledged by psychologists as well as 
economists. A child’s cognitive skills have been firmly established as a factor that 
impacts his or her socioeconomic success later in life. Non-cognitive skills, though 
somewhat less examined in the literature, are arguably equally as important for a child’s 
future labor market outcomes (Cuhna and Heckman, 2008; Heckman, Stixrud, Urzua, 
2006a). With the increase in female labor force participation over recent decades, an 
ample body of literature has emerged focusing on the effects of maternal employment on 
children’s well-being. Only a few studies, however, have focused on direct measures of 
maternal time or quality dimensions of maternal time investments. Also, the specific 
ways and channels in which maternal time is actually being invested have not been 
systematically considered. In this study, I revisit the topic of the effects of the time a 
mother spends with her children on a set of cognitive test scores, as well as behavioral 
and socio-emotional outcomes, by using a more direct measure of mother-child time from 
time diaries data. 
Parental time devoted to children constitutes a tremendous investment in child-
rearing. From the point of view of economic theories advanced by Becker, the cost of a 
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mother’s time is a major part of the total cost of producing and rearing children (Becker, 
1981). Given the importance of cognitive ability and non-cognitive skills for future labor 
market outcomes, maternal time investment deserves special attention, as it comprises 
one of the most sizable inputs into the production of both types of skills. Understanding 
the mechanisms of maternal time allocation and its impact on a child’s well-being can 
help in designing public policies that are aimed at improving future labor market 
outcomes of children.  
Prior research on maternal time investment and children’s outcomes has primarily 
relied on maternal employment as a proxy for mother’s time. It is assumed that longer 
hours of work translate into a reduction of time available for children. However, maternal 
employment might not adequately capture the amount of time that mothers devote to their 
children, let alone the quality of this maternal time. Despite a dramatic increase in 
women’s labor force participation, the trends in childcare time suggest an increase in 
maternal time devoted to children (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007; Bianchi, 2002; Ramey and 
Ramey, 2010; Fox, 2011). It is also reasonable to believe that it is not only the total 
amount of time that parents spend with their children that matters, but also the quality of 
the time that is being devoted to a given child. Therefore, using a direct measure of time 
for maternal time investment might better represent the mechanism through which 
maternal investment impacts a child’s cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes.  
In this study, I provide additional evidence on the effect of maternal time 
investment on children’s outcomes by utilizing a unique feature of the Child 
Development Supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID-CDS): 
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Children’s time diaries. These diaries allow the construction of a direct measure of the 
time that mothers spend with their children. I focus on the effect of maternal time on a set 
of math and reading test scores, as well as socio-emotional well-being and behavioral 
outcomes. The structure of the data also allows me to discern types of quality of maternal 
time, defined by the level of maternal involvement. For example, time diaries provide 
information on whether a mother was participating in an activity with a child, or whether 
she was simply present but not interacting with a child. Therefore, instead of focusing on 
aggregate maternal time, I investigate whether there are differential effects of direct 
maternal engagement with a child, as opposed to a mother simply being available for the 
child. Given that each type of hour with a child may not be equally productive, 
distinguishing between types of time captures a differential effect of quality dimensions 
of maternal time investment. I find that a child’s active engagement time with his or her 
mother has a greater effect on decreasing behavioral problems. I also find positive 
evidence of maternal time on the improvement of socio-emotional competence. In the 
case of cognitive skills, I find little support of a positive effect of maternal time on the 
development of these types of skills.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly describes literature on 
trends in childcare as evidenced by time use research, and also presents findings on 
maternal time investment and children’s outcomes. Section 2.3 describes the PSID child 
development supplement data, along with time diaries data used for analysis. Section 2.4 
presents a model and estimation procedure. Section 2.5 presents and discusses results, 
and Section 2.6 concludes.  
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2.2. Literature Review 
One of the interesting findings from the time use research is the increase in the 
amount of time that mothers spend with their children, despite the increase in women’s 
labor force participation over the last decades. For example, Fox et al. (2011) find that 
both working and non-working parents spent more time with children in 2003-2008 than 
their counterparts in 1975. Similarly, Ramey and Ramey (2010), linking twelve time use 
surveys between 1965 and 2007, show that an increase in childcare has been twice as 
great for college educated parents in comparison to less educated parents. The increase in 
market work for women over the last decades has been “financed” mostly by a decrease 
in housework, and not childcare (Fox et al., 2011; Bianchi, 2000). Analysis of the U.S. 
time data indicates that employed mothers do spend less time with their children 
compared to non-working parents, but the difference is smaller than what might be 
expected (Nock and Kingston, 1988; Huston and Rosenkrantz, 2005). 
The literature that examines the effect of maternal time with children and 
children’s outcomes, while focusing on maternal employment as a proxy for maternal 
time, provides mixed findings. Some of the studies cite negative effects of maternal 
employment (Ruhm, 2008; Aizer, 2004; Bernal, 2011; Liu, Mroz, Van der Klaauw, 2010; 
Hill, 2005), while others find no effect, or varying effects, depending on the group under 
investigation and outcomes analyzed (James-Burdumy, 2005; Aughinbaugh and 
Gittleman, 2004). The disparities in findings might stem from the fact that studies differ 
by children’s age groups, the timing of maternal inputs, sets of control variables, methods 
to account for the endogeneity of maternal employment and their inability to fully control 
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for all relevant inputs. Maternal employment may poorly capture the extent of mother-
child involvement, as mothers tend to “protect” their mother-child time. In addition, 
working mothers may optimize their amount of available time, shifting it toward more 
stimulating and interactive activities (Bernal et al. 2011). Despite the theoretical 
importance of time resources as one of the major inputs for a child’s cognitive and non-
cognitive development, only a few studies used a direct measure of time when estimating 
the effect of maternal time spent with children on a child’s well-being. 
Hsin (2007) uses PSID time diaries data to investigate the effect of maternal 
involvement during preschool years on children’s cognitive outcomes, assessed at ages 5 
to 12. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and an extensive set of controls, she finds a 
positive and persistent relationship between the quantity of time mothers spent with 
children and the children’s language development. However, this positive effect is only 
present for children who spent time with verbally skilled mothers. Interestingly, the 
intensity of maternal care, defined as a percentage of time spent on active interaction, 
does not have an effect on children’s test scores. The researcher posits that maternal time 
investment may differentially affect children, as women differ in their ability to influence 
their children’s cognitive development.  
Bernal et al. (2011), use data from a Colombian Hogares Comunitarios survey to 
study the differential effect of quantity versus quality of maternal time on children’s 
cognitive and non-cognitive development. The researchers measure the quantity of time 
as the total time devoted to childcare, and define quality of maternal time as a fraction of 
total time devoted to teaching-learning routines. To address endogeneity issues, they rely 
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on an instrumental variables approach. In particular, they use a set of local labor demand 
conditions such as female labor force participation, male and female wages and fraction 
of workers in the service sector. They find that, in terms of cognitive skills, both quantity 
and quality of time have beneficial effects. Quality of time, however, in all cases has a 
larger effect on a child’s development when compared to quantity of time. Interestingly, 
regarding socio-emotional outcomes, the quality of maternal time improves these 
outcomes, while the quantity of time has an adverse effect on the socio-emotional 
development of a child. 
 Fiorini and Keane (2011) utilize time diaries data from the Longitudinal Study of 
Australian Children (LSAC) to analyze how a child’s allocation of time among different 
activities affects cognitive and non-cognitive development. They aggregate time into nine 
mutually exclusive activities, including educational activities with parents, general care, 
media, sleeping, social activities, and more. To account for endogeneity, the researchers 
estimate the outcome production function under alternative specifications such as value 
added (both with contemporaneous and lagged inputs), and fixed effects. The 
researchers’ goal is to determine if there is a ranking of activities that is robust across 
various specifications. Their findings indicate that children’s time spent in educational 
activities with parents is the most productive input for the development of cognitive 
skills. However, when it comes to non-cognitive skills, children’s time allocation is not 
important. These skills are greatly influenced by parenting style, including a mother’s 
displays of affection and warmth, and effective discipline.  
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The research in this paper will complement the existing time use literature that 
studies the effect of maternal time with children on children’s outcomes, by providing 
new evidence from PSID time diaries. Instead of concentrating solely on total maternal 
time, I will investigate the differential effect of active versus passive maternal 
involvement, which can be indicative as to the overall quality of time investment. The use 
of time diaries to study maternal time investment can offer valuable insight into maternal 
time allocation, and it can also help to understand the channels through which maternal 
time is invested.  
2.3. Data 
The data for this study come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
and its three waves of the Child Development Supplement (CDS). The PSID is a 
nationally representative longitudinal survey, which started in 1968 and has been 
providing annual data on numerous topics, including employment, income, wealth, 
marriage, and others. In 1997, PSID began collecting information on 3,586 PSID children 
ages 0-12 by surveying primary caregivers, teachers, absent parents, school 
administrators and the children themselves. Two subsequent data collections occurred in 
2002/2003 and 2007/2008, with 2,907 and 1,507 interviews respectively. Most of the 
decrease in the sample size in the second and third waves resulted from children leaving 
the sample after reaching 18. Only 1997 cohort was reinterviewed and no new children 
were added in the later waves. Appendix D provides more information on sample 
composition.  
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2.3.1. Time Diaries 
In addition to providing detailed information on child developmental outcomes, 
all three waves of the CDS include child’s time diaries, which record detailed summaries 
of activities undertaken by a child on a randomly selected weekday and weekend day. In 
cases where a child was too small to complete the time diary, information has been 
provided by a primary caregiver, who in most cases was the child’s mother. The unique 
time use data allow us to identify the exact amount of a mother’s time spent with a child. 
The questions of whether a given mother was participating in an activity, or whether she 
was present but not involved in the activity, enable us to disaggregate time into active 
time with a child and passive time with a child. The classification of the time into active 
and passive can be indicative of the overall quality of parental time, where active time 
would correspond to high quality time, and passive time would measure low quality time. 
The measure of quality defined by the level of parental involvement has been used in 
previous research as one of the ways of addressing time quality heterogeneity (Yueng, 
2009; Kalenkoski and Foster, 2008).  
In the first CDS wave, 82% of respondents returned time diaries. The response 
rates for the subsequent waves were 88% and 86% respectively. Table 2.1 provides basic 
characteristics of mother-child time obtained from aggregating time diaries. The 
estimates are given for weekday, weekend day and total week, and are differentiated by 
passive and active maternal involvement. Time estimates for the entire week are derived 
by multiplying weekdays by five, and weekend days by two, then summing the two 
products.  
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Table 2.2 provides a more detailed breakdown of mother-child time by child’s 
age. For instance, children up to 3 years old spend, on average, 4.48 hours of active time 
with a mother per weekday, while children between 13 and 16 years spend 1.32 hours of 
active time with their mother. Also, the amounts of both active and passive maternal time 
are larger on weekend days as compared to weekdays. Figure 2.1 provides a graphical 
breakdown of mother-child weekly time by age groups over the three waves of CDS time 
diaries. As expected, mothers with younger children spend significantly more time being 
actively involved with their children. Interestingly, when children are young the amount 
of active time is greater in comparison to passive time. The trend reverses, however, as 
the children grow older, with passive time becoming more predominant.  
The CDS data were linked to PSID individual and family level files to obtain 
mother and household information. I focus my attention on children less than 17 years 
old, who had mothers as their primary caregiver. This restriction reduces somewhat the 
CDS children sample. Table 2.3 provides information on the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of the children’s sample by CDS wave, as well as for all three 
waves combined.  
2.3.2. Outcomes Measures
4
 
As one of the outcome measures of a child’s non-cognitive development, I use the 
Behavior Problems Index (BPI), which measures the severity and incidence of a given 
child’s behavioral problems. The BPI is often examined in developmental psychology 
                                                          
4
 A detailed description of the set of items and questions used in the construction of outcome measures is 
found in the Appendix D. 
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literature, as well as in economic studies, alongside other cognitive skills (Ruhm, 2004; 
Dunifon, Kalil, Rucker, 2012; Bernal and Keane, 2011). The index is constructed for 
children 3 years of age and older by using answers from the primary caregiver on a set of 
30 questions regarding whether or not a child exhibited specific problem behaviors. Some 
of the behaviors include: whether the child cheats or tells lies; whether the child has 
sudden mood changes; whether the child is being disobedient, anxious, stubborn, 
depressed, etc. The response scale ranges from 1 to 30, where a higher score translates 
into a higher prevalence of negative behavior. The average score on the BPI is 7.99, with 
a standard deviation of 6.04.  
Another measure of a child’s non-cognitive outcomes used in this paper is the 
Positive Behavior Scale, indicating a child’s social and emotional competence. The 
original measure was developed for the New Chance Study
5
 to capture positive behaviors 
in children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Similar to the BPI, the Positive Behavior 
Scale is estimated for children older than 3 years. It is provided by a primary caregiver, 
and incorporates answers to a set of 10 questions on a scale from 1 to 5, ranging from 
“not at all like my child” to “totally like my child.” The average score on the Positive 
Behavior Scale is 4.18, with a standard deviation of 0.57. Some of the items in the 
Positive Behavior Scale assess whether the child is happy or curious, and also whether 
the child is admired and well liked by others.  
                                                          
5
 New Chance was a national research project that provided education, training and other services aimed at 
improving the prospects of low-income mothers and their children.  
 
69 
To assess the effect of maternal time on a child’s cognitive skills, I use Letter-
Word Identification test scores and Applied Problems test scores. These tests are a part of 
Woodcock Johnson Tests of Achievement, a battery of tests intended to measure various 
aspects of a child’s academic achievement for children older than 3 years. The Applied 
Problems test measures skills in analyzing and solving mathematical problems. The 
Letter-Word Identification test assesses reading identification skills and symbolic 
learning (matching pictures with words). PSID provides both a raw and age-standardized 
version of the test scores. In my analysis, I use age-standardized measures of the test 
scores. The basic characteristics of the outcome measures—by gender, race and mother’s 
education—are summarized in Table 2.4. 
2.4. Conceptual Framework and Estimation  
The conceptual framework relies on a model developed by Becker (1965), as well 
as a rich body of literature examining the effect of maternal investments on child 
development. Let us assume that a mother maximizes her utility from a well-cared for 
and high achieving child. She also obtains utility from consumption and leisure. The 
mother’s utility function is subject to the child’s development production function 
(which, in my case is represented by a set of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills), the 
mother’s time and budget constraints. Suppose that the mother’s utility function takes the 
following form: 
   Max U(Y, C, L)     (1)                                                           
            L = T* - H - TA - γTP        (2)                                     
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Y = F( TA, TP, G, µ )       (3)        
C + Gp = wH + I, (4)                                                    
where Y denotes a child’s development, L is the hours of leisure and C  is the mother’s 
consumption. The constraint on the mother’s time is given by (2), where T* is the total 
amount of time available to the mother, H is hours of work, TA represents the amount of 
time devoted to active engagement with a child, while TP denotes the amount of time 
being accessible to the child and parameter γ (where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) allows for passive time to 
be less costly in terms of forgone leisure. The production process of the child’s 
achievement is represented by (3). Both active and passive maternal time enter as inputs 
into the child’s development through the production function for cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. The skill production function also includes goods inputs G (e.g. books, 
toys, and other non-time inputs) and the child’s specific endowment ability µ. The mother 
faces a budget constraint (4), where the price of C is normalized to one, p is the price of 
G, w is the mother’s wage rate and I is non-labor income. In sum, a mother chooses both 
the amount of active and passive time with her child, consumption, and leisure in order to 
maximize her utility function subject to the constraints (2)-(4). Optimization of the model 
allows us to obtain the demand functions for maternal time inputs, and provides the 
child’s development production function.  
In my empirical strategy, I estimate the following cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills production function for the i
th
 child from the j
th
 family at time period t: 
Yijt = β0 + β1TAijt + β2TPijt + β3Gijt + β4Xijt + β5Zit + µij + αj + ɛijt,  (5) 
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where Y is a measure of socio-emotional, behavioral and cognitive outcomes; TA is the 
maternal active time investment, TP stands for passive time investment; G refers to goods 
and services invested into the child, proxied by family income; X is a vector of a child’s 
characteristics, including his/her age at the time of the interview, gender, race, weight at 
birth, and the child’s health at birth. Z is a vector of household and mother characteristics 
such as: the mother’s education level, her score on a passage comprehension test, whether 
the household is headed by a female, the number of children residing in the household, 
and the controls for region of residence. Finally, µ represents the child’s unobserved 
endowments, α stands for the mother’s unobserved endowments and ɛ is a random error 
term.  
The difficulty in obtaining a causal effect of maternal time on children’s cognitive 
and non-cognitive development is complicated by the endogeneity of the maternal time 
input (as well as family income and number of children). The amount of time that 
mothers spend with children may depend on unobserved mother or child characteristics 
(both µij and αj, in the context of equation (5)), which can influence the mother’s time 
investment decisions and the child’s developmental outcomes. Mothers who devote more 
time to their children may be systematically different from mothers who devote less time, 
in both observable and unobservable ways. At the same time, a child’s unobservable 
characteristics may govern the amount of time that mothers spend with their child. For 
instance, if a child has a difficult predisposition, the mother may decide to spend more 
time with the child. While it is possible to appropriately control for observable maternal 
characteristics, the failure to account for unobservable characteristics will result in a 
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biased estimate of the parameter of the production function. To identify the effect of 
maternal time investment, I use child fixed effects, considering only contemporaneous 
inputs, value added and value added fixed effects specifications to incorporate the 
cumulative nature of the skill production process. The sub-sections below provide more 
details on the estimation models.  
2.4.1. Fixed Effect Estimation 
 In order to control for the endogeneity of maternal time inputs, I employ child 
specific fixed effects. The child specific fixed effects estimator takes advantage of the 
longitudinal nature of the data, as outcomes and inputs measures are available at three 
different points in time. In this case, the effect of maternal time with children is identified 
through the variation in maternal time allocation across the CDS waves. In the case of 
two time periods, fixed effects estimation is equivalent to first difference. With more time 
periods, fixed effects framework corresponds to subtracting child-level means from both 
sides of the equation and regressing demeaned outcome measures on demeaned 
explanatory variables. The child specific fixed effect differences out permanent 
unobservable characteristics of children µij that can influence maternal time decisions and 
a child’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Also, this technique eliminates unobserved 
maternal characteristics αj that are constant over time. The child specific fixed effect, 
however, does not control for characteristics that vary over time. For example, if the child 
develops depression over the CDS sample period that affects his or her social skills and 
the mother’s time allocation, the child fixed effects will fail to control for this. 
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Additionally, fixed effect models are known to increase attenuation bias in the presence 
of a measurement error. Fixed effects specification allows us to difference out time 
invariant unobservable characteristics, but at the same time eliminates a large amount of 
variation in the data. In the simple OLS framework, measurement error in the 
independent variable leads to bias towards zero. However, in the fixed effects estimation, 
the problems associated with measurement error are typically amplified.  
2.4.2. Value Added Specification 
Skill formation is a cumulative process that depends on past and current parental 
inputs into a child’s development production function. However, a lack of data on all past 
investments precludes incorporating all relevant data in the estimation procedures. One of 
the ways to circumvent this issue includes the value added specification
6
. Generally, the 
value added specification relates achievement outcome measures to contemporaneous 
investments and lagged achievement measures. In this case, it is assumed that the lagged 
outcome measures incorporate sufficient information for historical inputs and a child’s 
ability. However, estimation of this specification poses difficulty, as lagged outcome 
measure is correlated with an error term. Instead, I estimate a restricted version of value 
added specification, where an incremental change in test scores is a function of 
contemporaneous inputs.  
                                                          
6
 This approach is commonly employed in economics of education literature and in the estimation of 
production function for non-cognitive and cognitive skills (Cunha and Hackman, 2003; Todd and Wolpin, 
2003; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2005). 
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The value added model can be derived from a cumulative production function in 
the following way. Assume that true production technology can be expressed as a 
function of current and all historical parental investment: 
Yit = Xitβ1 + Xit-1β2 + …+ Xi1βt + θi + ɛit,     (6) 
where X incorporates all parental investments at time t for child i, θ is a child’s ability, 
which incorporates child specific and maternal unobserved components (both µij and αj, 
in the context of equation (5)) and ɛ is an error term. Taking the difference between 
current achievement and prior achievement multiplied by parameter ʎ and collecting 
terms provides: 
Yit - ʎYit-1 = Xitβ1 + Xit-1(β2 - ʎβ1) + …+ Xi1 (βt - ʎβt-1) + (θt - ʎθt-1) + ɛit - ɛt-1 . (7) 
Assuming that achievement in previous periods contributes cumulatively to future 
achievement without depreciation (ʎ=1), the effect of each input is independent of the age 
at which it is applied (βt=βt-1), and the effect of the ability endowment is also independent 
of achievement age (θt=θt-1) gives:  
∆Y = Yit - Yit-1 = Xitβ1 + ɛit - ɛt-1,     (8) 
where the gain in test scores is expressed as a function of contemporaneous inputs. This 
specification is referred to in the literature as restricted value added. Its estimates are 
based on a gain or evolution of cognitive and non-cognitive achievement rather than on 
level of achievement. By focusing on gains in outcome measures, this model eliminates 
the need to adjust the estimate of maternal investments for historical inputs prior to year t. 
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Finally, the availability of three waves of CDS time diaries allows the gain in child’s 
scores to depend on a child’s unobservable characteristics that may impact maternal time 
allocation and gains in test scores. If we assume that a child’s unobservable 
characteristics impacting score gains are time invariant, then incorporating child fixed 
effects will difference out this unobserved component. Essentially, in the case of value 
added fixed effects, I am comparing gains in scores of children from wave 1 to 2 to gains 
made by the same children from waves 2 and 3.  
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Non-Cognitive Outcomes 
Table 2.5 summarizes the results of the effect of maternal time, measured in hours 
per week, on the child’s Behavior Problems Index by the estimation method. For the sake 
of comparison, I include the OLS results. The OLS estimates indicate that maternal 
time—both active and passive—exhibits a beneficial effect on BPI, with active time 
having a larger effect as compared to passive time. However, the OLS approach does not 
account for the presence of unobservable characteristics that may be correlated with the 
amount of time mothers spend with children and children’s outcomes. In column 2, the 
effect of maternal time on a child’s behavioral problems is estimated by fixed effects. 
Results from the fixed effects model indicate a beneficial effect of active and passive 
time on decreasing a child’s behavioral problems, with passive time having a slightly 
larger effect. Finally, results for value added specifications in columns 3 and 4 
incorporate the cumulative process of skill formation by focusing on gains in index 
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instead of levels. The value added estimation suggests that an increase of one hour of 
active maternal time per week with a child decreases the incremental change in BPI by 
0.0192 points (relative to the standard deviation of 6.04), while an hour of passive time 
decreases behavioral problems by 0.015 points. When evaluated at the mean BPI scores, 
an additional hour per week with a child accounts for 0.25% decrease in incremental 
change in BPI for active time and 0.19% for passive time. Both fixed effect and value 
added estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels. Finally, after 
controlling for an unobserved child’s ability in value added fixed effects specification in 
column 4, the effect of active maternal time decreases gains in behavioral problems by 
0.0159 points, while passive time exhibits a detrimental effect. Except for the case of 
simple fixed effects, the beneficial effect of active time is greater than that for passive 
time.  
Table 2.6 summarizes the results of the effect of active and passive maternal time 
on a Positive Behavior Scale. Regarding the OLS estimation, an increase of one hour of 
maternal time per week raises the Positive Behavior Scale by 0.0014 points, while 
passive maternal time has a negative effect. Controlling for both observed and 
unobserved time invariant characteristics in fixed effects estimation yields positive 
estimates for active and passive time.  In this case, the effects of both passive and active 
time are beneficial, but active has a greater impact: 0.0015 for active time and 0.0010 for 
passive time (relative to the standard deviation of 0.57). The estimates for value added 
specifications remain positive, yet the magnitude of the effect of passive time becomes 
larger in comparison to active time: 0.0016 points of incremental increase per hour of 
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active maternal time as compared to 0.0018 for passive time. Given that the mean of the 
Positive Behavior Scale is 4.18, an additional hour of active time is associated with an 
increase in incremental test scores of 0.03% for active time, and 0.04% for passive time. 
Finally, the value added fixed effects specification in column 4 renders an economically 
small negative effect of active maternal time and a positive effect of passive time. 
However, in the case of active time, the standard error triples in comparison to the value 
added specification. Also, the number of observations in the value added fixed effects 
specification is the smallest due to the demanding data requirements for this estimation 
method, which necessitates an availability of observations for the same child in all 3 
waves of the survey.  
2.5.2. Cognitive Outcomes 
The findings for reading scores, as measured by the Letter Word Identification 
test are presented in Table 2.7. The OLS estimates in the first column indicate a negative 
effect of active time and a positive effect of passive maternal time on a child’s reading 
score. The negative effect of active time may result from an omitted variable bias due to 
parents deciding to spend more time with children if they experience some difficulties at 
school. However, controlling for unobserved time invariant characteristics in the fixed 
effects estimation reverses the negative sign on a mother’s active time. In particular, an 
increase of one hour of a mother’s active time per week with a child raises the child’s 
reading score by 0.0133 points (relative to the standard deviation of 18.06), while passive 
time exhibits a negative effect. In the third column, the results of the value added 
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specification suggest that an hour of active mother’s time per week increases the gain in a 
child’s score by 0.0263 points, while the effect of passive time is on the order of 0.0103 
points. Given that the mean score on the Letter Word test is 103.65, this is a small effect. 
Finally, in the case of value added fixed effects, active time has negative impact, while 
passive time has almost no effect. The standard errors, however, are large and the point 
estimates are imprecisely estimated. One of the shortfalls of the fixed effects estimation, 
in the case of value added specification, is an efficiency loss due to differencing and 
demanding data requirements.  
Finally, Table 2.8 summarizes the results of the effect of maternal time on a 
child’s math scores, as measured by the Applied Problems test. OLS results show a much 
smaller effect of active maternal involvement, as compared to passive maternal time. 
After incorporating a child’s fixed effects in column (2), passive time becomes less 
important, with active time having larger point estimate. For instance, an increase in one 
hour of maternal time per week increases a child’s reading score by 0.0435 points for 
active time, and 0.0339 for passive time (relative to the mean of 104 and standard 
deviation of 16.86). The results from the value added specification provide a positive 
effect of active time and negative effects of passive time. Both point estimates are small 
in magnitude and not statistically significant, with standard errors that are much larger 
than the point estimates in the case of active and passive time. Finally, results of the value 
added fixed effects indicate a negative effect of both passive and active time on gains in 
test score. For instance, an additional hour of maternal time decreases incremental gain in 
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scores by 0.1152 points, while the 95% confidence interval ranges between -0.2660 to 
0.0356.  
2.6. Conclusions 
In this study, I investigate the effect of maternal time with children on a set of 
cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes by using a direct measure of mother-child time 
from CDS time diaries. I focus on two measures of maternal time investment, 
distinguished by the level of maternal engagement with a child: active time and passive 
time. Generally, I find a larger beneficial effect for active maternal time on reducing a 
child’s behavioral problems, as opposed to passive time. The effect of time that a mother 
spends in active engagement with her child is more valuable than when she simply is 
accessible to him or her. The results for a Positive Behavior Scale indicate, overall, a 
positive effect of maternal time. Despite the larger effect of active time in the child fixed 
effects model, value added specification provides a somewhat greater effect of the 
passive time. Focusing on the cumulative process of skill formation in the value added 
approach, I find a greater effect of active time on the improvement of reading scores, as 
compared to passive time, however, the estimated effects are small in magnitude. 
Incorporating fixed effects into the value added model yields a negative effect of active 
time and increases standard errors. With regard to the Applied Problems test, there seems 
to be little support for maternal time improving math scores, while both active and 
passive time exhibit a negative effect in the value added fixed effects models. Overall, the 
results suggest that maternal time has a larger impact on non-cognitive skills formation, 
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especially on decreasing a child’s behavioral problems in comparison with its impact on a 
child’s cognitive scores.  
Understanding the effects of the quality of maternal time on different aspects of 
child development can be crucial toward designing public policies aimed at improving 
future labor outcomes for children. Most prior research has focused on the importance of 
the aggregate quantity of maternal time and policies that might lead to overall increases 
or decreases in total maternal time available to a child. Yet, if the quality of time is more 
valuable, the focus needs to be directed at improving different aspects of parenting that 
promote higher levels of mother-child interaction. As future time use data become 
available, research needs to address further the differential effect of the quality of 
maternal time as opposed to the total amount of time.  
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Figure 2.1 
Weekly Mother-Child Time by Age  
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Table 2.1 
Mother-Child Time Use by Wave (in Hours)  
  
  Wave 1  Wave 2 Wave 3 
  1997 2002-2003 2007-2008 
Variable Mean Mean Mean 
Active weekday 3.01  1.88  1.52  
 
(2.48) (1.80) (1.76) 
Active weekend day 4.79  3.54  3.20  
  (3.23) (3.11) (3.03) 
Total active per week 24.63  16.49  13.98  
 
(15.69) (12.09) (12.09) 
    Passive weekday 2.59  2.05  2.43  
 
(2.23) (2.05) (2.06) 
Passive weekend day 3.76  3.27  3.93  
  (2.83) (3.04) (3.31) 
Total passive per week 20.47  16.79  20.02  
 
(13.46) (13.31) (13.86) 
Observations 2481  2088 1141 
Notes: Active time refers to all types of activities in which mother was 
participating. Passive time refers to all activities for which mother was 
reported present but not participating. Hour is a unit of measurement. 
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Table 2.2 
Mother-Child Time by Age (in Hours)  
        Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Variable Age 1-3 Age 4-6 Age 7-9 Age 10-12 Age 13-16 
Active weekday 4.48  2.59  2.15  1.80  1.32  
 
(2.73) (1.91) (1.87) (1.81) (1.84) 
Active weekend day 5.88  4.68  4.13  3.62  2.57  
 
(3.05) (3.08) (3.15) (3.20) (2.88) 
Total active per week 34.15  22.39  19.00  16.28  11.77  
 
(16.51) (12.62) (11.97) (12.20) (12.33) 
      Passive weekday 2.87  2.35  2.06  2.27  2.21  
 
(2.47) (2.16) (1.95) (2.05) (2.20) 
Passive weekend day 3.39  3.82  3.65  3.56  3.28  
 
(2.43) (2.82) (3.06) (3.12) (3.28) 
Total passive per week 21.16  19.41  17.65  18.51  17.62  
 
(14.54) (13.00) (12.54) (13.52) (14.73) 
Observations 763  1045 1062 1547  1293 
Notes: Active time refers to all types of activities in which the mother was participating. Passive 
time refers to all activities for which the mother was reported present but not participating. 
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Table 2.3 
Sample Demographics by Wave 
     
Variable 
Mean 
 1997 
Mean 
 2002-2003 
Mean 
 2007-2008 
All Years 
Child male 0.52  0.50  0.51  0.51  
 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Child black 0.37  0.37  0.38  0.37  
 
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) 
Other race 0.12  0.12  0.13  0.12  
 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33) 
Birth weight (pounds) 6.84  6.84  6.88  6.85  
 
(1.48) (1.50) (1.41) (1.47) 
Better health at birth 0.27  0.28  0.30  0.28  
 
(0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) 
Worse health at birth 0.09  0.08  0.07  0.08  
 
(0.29) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28) 
Mother reading score 27.01  25.22  25.51  25.99  
 
(11.55) (13.13) (12.75) (12.48) 
Reading score missing (mother) 0.13  0.19  0.18  0.16  
 
(0.34) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) 
High school dropout (mother) 0.19  0.18  0.17  0.18  
 
(0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) 
High school graduate (mother) 0.31  0.28  0.29  0.29  
 
(0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) 
Family income (thousands) 50.04  61.92  61.55  57.18  
 
(46.29) (80.52) (62.94) (65.35) 
Female headed household 0.28  0.28  0.35  0.30  
 
(0.45) (0.45) (0.48) (0.46) 
Children in the family 2.34  2.28  2.26  2.30  
 
(1.05) (1.04) (1.07) (1.05) 
Observations 2481 2088  1141  5710 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Average health at birth, Whites and mothers 
with more than 12 years of education are omitted categories. Income is measured in 
2000 dollars. 
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Table 2.4 
Basic Characteristics of the Outcome Measures 
     
Variable  BPI 
Positive 
Behavior  
Letter  
Word  
Applied 
Problems 
Overall 7.99  4.18  103.65  104.36  
 
(6.04) (0.57) (18.06) (16.86) 
Male 8.33  4.12  102.13  104.81  
 
(6.12) (0.58) (18.29) (17.55) 
Female 7.63  4.25  105.20  103.90  
 
(5.93) (0.56) (17.69) (16.11) 
Blacks 8.06  4.21  97.71  97.20  
 
(6.37) (0.60) (16.60) (14.69) 
Whites 7.96  4.13  108.42  110.38  
 
(5.84) (0.54) (17.63) (16.00) 
Mother's education =<12 8.53  4.18  98.88  99.60  
 
(6.41) (0.62) (16.87) (15.49) 
Mother's education >12 7.49  4.19  107.79  108.49  
 
(5.63) (0.53) (18.04) (16.91) 
Observations 5052  5137  4698  4686  
Measurement scale (0-30) (1-5) 28-197 19-171 
Eligibility Age 3+ Age 3+ Age 3+ Age 3+ 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis 
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Table 2.5 
Effect of Maternal Time on Child’s Behavior Problems Index 
(mean 7.99, sd 6.04) 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS 
Fixed 
 Effects 
Value  
Added (VA) 
VA Fixed 
Effects 
     Active time (hours per week) -0.0194 -0.0166 -0.0192 -0.0159 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.026) 
     Passive time (hours per week) -0.0068 -0.0183 -0.015 0.0198 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.026) 
     Male 0.6576 
 
-0.7538 
 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.229) 
 
     Black -1.1915 
 
-0.4322 
 
 
(0.312) 
 
(0.360) 
 
     Mother reading score -0.0225 
 
-0.0199 
 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.029) 
 
     High school dropout (mother) 1.4371 -0.0791 -0.1549 2.6486 
 
(0.354) (0.693) (0.417) (2.909) 
     High school graduate (mother) 0.5855 -1.2112 -0.2660 2.1167 
 
(0.275) (0.595) (0.275) (2.306) 
     Family income (thousands) -0.0048 -0.0008 -0.0023 0.0068 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
     Female headed household 1.2241 -0.4382 -0.0558 1.4207 
 
(0.259) (0.374) (0.324) (1.383) 
     Children in the household 0.0205 -0.1995 -0.0711 0.2448 
 
(0.108) (0.147) (0.125) (0.613) 
Observations 5052 4028 2160 824 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on household. All regressions additionally control for 
region of residence, child's birth weight, health at birth, age dummies, and number of 
children in the household. Mother with more than 12 years of education is an omitted 
group. Column (1) includes observations from three waves of PSID-CDS. Column (2) 
includes observations for children who have more than one observation in the sample. 
Column (3) pools observations for incremental changes from wave 1 to 2 and wave 2 to 3. 
Finally, column (4) only includes observations for a child if he or she has observations in all 
three waves, in order to take the difference between outcome change from wave 1 to 2 and 
outcome change from wave 2 to 3.  
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Table 2.6 
Effect of Maternal Time on Child’s Positive Behavior Scale 
(mean 4.18, sd 0.57) 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS 
Fixed 
 Effects 
Value  
Added (VA) 
VA Fixed 
Effects 
     
Active time (hours per week) 0.0014 0.0015 0.0016 -0.0009 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
     Passive time (hours per week) -0.0005 0.0010 0.0018 0.0038 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
     Male -0.121 
 
0.0416 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.023) 
 
     Black 0.1385 
 
0.0175 
 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.036) 
 
     Mother reading score -0.0055 
 
0.0012 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
     High school dropout (mother) -0.0112 0.0281 0.0789 -0.501 
 
(0.031) (0.068) (0.046) (0.240) 
     High school graduate (mother) -0.0479 0.0303 0.0147 -0.1284 
 
(0.025) (0.058) (0.029) (0.239) 
     Family income (thousands) 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0006 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
     Female headed household -0.0963 -0.0126 0.0183 -0.1513 
 
(0.023) (0.038) (0.033) (0.128) 
     Children in the household 0.0044 0.0043 0.0249 0.0630 
 
(0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.054) 
Observations 5,137 4,133 2,216 862 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on household. All regressions additionally control for 
region of residence, child's birth weight, health at birth, age dummies, and number of 
children in the household. Mother with more than 12 years of education is an omitted 
group. Column (1) includes observations from three waves of PSID-CDS. Column (2) 
includes observations for children who have more than one observation in the sample. 
Column (3) pools observations for incremental changes from wave 1 to 2 and wave 2 to 3. 
Finally, column (4) only includes observations for a child if he or she has observations in all 
three waves, in order to take the difference between outcome change from wave 1 to 2 and 
outcome change from wave 2 to 3.  
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Table 2.7 
Effect of Maternal Time on Letter Word Identification Test 
(mean 103.65, sd 18.06) 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS 
Fixed 
 Effects 
Value  
Added (VA) 
VA Fixed 
Effects 
Active time (hours per week) -0.0039 0.0133 0.0263 -0.0210 
 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.028) (0.067) 
     Passive Time (hours per week) 0.0527 -0.0125 0.0103 0.0003 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.067) 
     Male -3.2 
 
0.3981 
 
 
(0.595) 
 
(0.603) 
 
     Black -5.1445 
 
-4.1089 
 
 
(0.925) 
 
(0.948) 
 
     Mother reading score 0.6278 
 
0.0841 
 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.069) 
 
     High school dropout (mother) -6.0468 3.0053 0.6036 16.7636 
 
(0.951) (2.039) (1.014) (6.305) 
     High school graduate (mother) -4.5383 0.8830 -0.4708 13.0585 
 
(0.812) (1.676) (0.756) (5.157) 
     Family income (thousands) 0.0176 -0.0106 -0.0124 0.0401 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.023) 
     Female headed household -1.7945 -0.6217 -0.1130 0.0150 
 
(0.761) (0.999) (0.830) (2.529) 
     Children in the household -1.364 -0.3023 0.2579 0.0956 
 
(0.291) (0.400) (0.319) (1.509) 
Observations 4,698 3,650 1,956 716 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on household. All regressions additionally control for 
region of residence, child's birth weight, health at birth, age dummies, and number of 
children in the household. Mother with more than 12 years of education is an omitted 
group. Column (1) includes observations from three waves of PSID-CDS. Column (2) 
includes observations for children who have more than one observation in the sample. 
Column (3) pools observations for incremental changes from wave 1 to 2 and wave 2 to 3. 
Finally, column (4) only includes observations for a child if he or she has observations in 
all three waves, in order to take the difference between outcome change from wave 1 to 2 
and outcome change from wave 2 to 3.  
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Table 2.8 
Effect of Maternal Time on Applied Problems Score 
(mean 104, sd 16.86) 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS 
Fixed 
 Effects 
Value  
Added (VA) 
VA Fixed 
Effects 
     
Active time (hours per week) 0.0006 0.0435 0.0056 -0.1152 
 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.077) 
     Passive time (hours per week) 0.0311 0.0339 0.0184 -0.0633 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.067) 
     Male 0.8585 
 
1.3891 
 
 
(0.518) 
 
(0.599) 
 
     Black -8.6269 
 
-2.1655 
 
 
(0.760) 
 
(0.913) 
 
     Mother reading score 0.4925 
 
-0.0728 
 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.081) 
 
     High school dropout (mother) -5.7769 -3.2300 0.6607 -7.0267 
 
(0.887) (2.062) (1.063) (6.546) 
     High school graduate (mother) -4.4356 -1.5629 -0.3052 2.3184 
 
(0.712) (1.952) (0.753) (5.912) 
     Family income (thousands) 0.0219 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0425 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.018) 
     Female headed household 0.1519 0.3323 -0.2841 -1.0062 
 
(0.676) (0.959) (0.794) (3.637) 
     Children in the household -0.7468 -0.2567 0.6161 0.0447 
 
(0.243) (0.366) (0.306) (1.343) 
Observations 4,686 3,638 1,946 708 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on household. All regressions additionally control for 
region of residence, child's birth weight, health at birth, age dummies, and number of 
children in the household. Mother with more than 12 years of education is an omitted 
group. Column (1) includes observations from three waves of PSID-CDS. Column (2) 
includes observations for children who have more than one observation in the sample. 
Column (3) pools observations for incremental changes from wave 1 to 2 and wave 2 to 3. 
Finally, column (4) only includes observations for a child if he or she has observations in all 
three waves, in order to take the difference between outcome change from wave 1 to 2 and 
outcome change from wave 2 to 3.  
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APPENDIX D  
 
Table 2.9 
Mother-Child Active Time by Wave 
      Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Variables 1997 2002-2003  2007-2008 
Caring for household children 0.43  0.43  0.33  
 
(1.28) (1.49) (1.59) 
Obtaining goods and services 2.55  1.62  1.61  
 
(4.54) (3.41) (3.73) 
Receiving care 8.24  4.06  3.38  
 
(7.01) (3.99) (4.04) 
Educational activities 1.38  1.43  1.29  
 
(2.90) (2.83) (2.87) 
Organizational activities 1.08  1.02  1.09  
 
(2.91) (2.86) (3.14) 
Entertainment and social activities 1.40  1.22  1.18  
 
(3.54) (3.62) (3.29) 
Sports and active leisure 4.23  1.22  0.95  
 
(7.08) (2.81) (2.54) 
Passive leisure 4.81  4.38  3.67  
 
(5.82) (5.83) (5.44) 
Household activities 0.77  0.80  0.66  
 
(1.75) (1.92) (1.99) 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis.  
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Behavior Problems Index (Survey Items)* 
B29. For the next set of statements, decide whether they are not true, sometimes true, or 
often true, of (child’s) behavior. He/She … 
 
a. ... has sudden changes in mood or feeling.  
b. ... feels or complains that no one loves him/her.  
c. ... is rather high strung, tense and nervous.  
d. ... cheats or tells lies.  
e. ... is too fearful or anxious.  
f. ... argues too much.  
g. ... has difficulty concentrating, cannot pay attention for long.  
h. ... is easily confused, seems to be in a fog.  
i. ... bullies or is cruel or mean to others.  
j. ... is disobedient.  
k. ... does not seem to feel sorry after misbehaves.  
l. ... has trouble getting along with other people (his/her) age.  
m. ... is impulsive, or acts without thinking.  
n. ... feels worthless or inferior.  
o. ... is not liked by other people (his/her) age  
p. ... has a lot of difficulty getting (his/her) mind off certain thoughts.  
q. ... is restless or overly active, cannot sit still.  
r. ... is stubborn, sullen, or irritable.  
s. ... has a very strong temper and loses it easily.  
t. ... is unhappy, sad or depressed.  
u. ... is withdrawn, does not get involved with others.  
v. ... breaks things on purpose or deliberately destroys (his/her) own or another’s 
things. 
w. ... clings to adults. 
x. ... cries too much.  
y. ... demands a lot of attention.  
z. ... is too dependent on others.  
aa. ... feels others are out to get (him/her).  
bb. ... hangs around with kids who get into trouble.  
cc. ... is secretive, keeps things to (himself/herself). 
dd. ... worries too much.  
ee. ... is disobedient at school.  
ff. ... has trouble getting along with teachers.  
*The total score is the sum of all responses for individual items.  
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Positive Behavior Scale (Survey Items) 
B30. Please tell me how much each statement applies to (child) on a scale from 1-5, 
where one means “not at all like your child,” and five means  “totally like your child,” 
and two, three and four are somewhere in between. (The total scores is the mean of all 
responses for individual items).  
 
a. Is cheerful, happy.  
b. Waits (his/her) turn in games and other activities.  
c. Does neat, careful work.  
d. Is curious and exploring, likes new experiences.  
e. Thinks before (he/she) acts, is not impulsive.  
f. Gets along well with other people (his/her) age.  
g. Usually does what you tell (him/her) to do.  
h. Can get over being upset quickly.  
i. Is admired and well-liked by other people (his/her) age.  
j. Tries to do things for (himself/herself), is self-reliant. 
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Data Appendix 
The PSID Child Development sample was drawn from 1997 PSID respondents. In 
CDS-1, 3,586 children aged 0-12 years were interviewed. Due to an initial oversampling 
of low-income families, the sample contains a large amount of Blacks and minority 
families. In 2002-2003, PSID interviewed CDS-1 children whose families remained 
active in PSID 2001 and who met the sample inclusion criteria (age and resides with 
primary caregiver), obtaining data on 2,907 children out of 3,271 “followable” children  
from ages 5 to 12. Finally, in 2007-2008, out of 1,609 CDS-2 children, 1,506 children 
aged 10-18 completed the interviews. Only the 1997 cohort of children was re-
interviewed and no new children were added into the subsequent survey waves. Most of 
the decrease in the sample size was due to the fact that children were leaving the sample 
as they reached 18.  
A unique feature of the PSID CDS is the availability of time diary data. The time 
diary survey was completed by 2,904 respondents in the first wave, 2,569 respondents in 
the second wave and 1,442 respondents in the last wave. The time diary data are available 
for a randomly selected weekday and a weekend day. I eliminate observations where time 
diary data are collected for only one day. Time data are reported by activities, and are 
aggregated into maternal active (if mother is participating in an activity) time and 
maternal passive (mother is around but not participating) time. Time diaries data were 
merged with CDS data and individual level PSID data files.  
I focus on children not older than 16 years of age and delete observations where 
the primary care giver is not a child’s mother. I restrict my sample to children who had 
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outcome measures for at least one of the dependent variables of interest. To preserve the 
number of observations, I use different samples for different outcomes of interest. The 
final sample yields 5,052 observations for the Behavior Problems Index outcome, 5,137 
observations for the Positive Behavior Scale, 4,698 observations for Letter Word test and 
4,686 observations for the Applied Problems scores.  
A very small number of children had time diary surveys available for all three 
waves. For instance, in the case of the Behavior Problems Index outcome, only 412 
children completed time diaries in all survey waves, while for the Letter Word 
Identification test, only 316 children had data in all three waves. As mentioned above, 
children were leaving the survey as they turned 18, so if they have completed a time diary 
in the first or second wave, we may not observe them in the last wave (especially if these 
were older children). Also, in some instances, the data are available in the third wave, but 
are missing early on.  
To maximize the sample size, I use different number of observations and assume 
that the data are missing at random. More specifically, in my empirical strategy, I 
estimate four different specifications, and the number of observation differs across the 
models due to various data requirements. For instance, the child fixed effects models 
include children who have observations in at least two waves (more than one observation 
per child). In the value added approach, I keep children who have observations in either 
wave 1 and 2 or waves 2 and 3. Finally, the value added fixed effects model is the most 
data intensive specification, and I only include in my sample children who have 
observations in all three waves.  
